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PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES UNDER THE MARYlAND 
SURVIVAL STATUTE: ADVOCATING DAMAGE RECOVERY 
FOR A DECEDENT'S FUTURE LOST EARNINGS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following scenario: Ms. Evelyn Manning, a fifty 
year old woman, drives her car down Route 202 in Prince George's 
County, Maryland, when it breaks down. l Moments later, another 
vehicle strikes her, pinning her against her disabled vehicle.2 As-
sume she is not killed, but instead severely injured, and now seeks a 
remedy under Maryland law. Further assume that, due to these inju-
ries, Ms. Manning's future lost earnings3 equal $500,000. 
Under Maryland law, Ms. Manning could file an action for per-
sonal injury, where she could recover up to $500,000 in damages for 
future lost earnings.4 Further, if Ms. Manning dies soon after receiv-
ing this damage award, her estate may retain the entire damage 
award under Maryland's estate law.5 In contrast, now assume that 
Ms. Manning dies prior to filing suit. Under current Maryland law, 
Ms. Manning's estate, acting as her agent, may bring the same per-
sonal injury action under the survival statute, but can not recover 
damages for the decedent's future lost earnings.6 
Based on this scenario, an injured party who lives and appears 
for trial is entitled to fair and reasonable compensation for the de-
1. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 122,716 A.2d 285, 286 (1998). 
2. Id. 
3. Future lost earnings are defined as: 
Wages, salary, or other income that a person could have earned if he 
or she had not lost a job, suffered a disabling irtiury, or died. Lost 
earnings are typically awarded as damages in personal-injury and 
wrongful-termination cases. There can be past lost earnings and fu-
ture lost earnings. 
BlACK'S LAw DlcnONARY 526 (7th ed. 1999). 
4. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-109 (1998). In Maryland, the term 
"'economic damages' means loss of earnings and medical expenses." Id. 
5. See MD. CODE ANN .. EST. & TRUSTS § 1-301 (1995) ("All property of a decedent 
shall be subject to the estates of decedents law, and upon the person's death 
shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall hold the legal title 
.... "). 
6. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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gree of i~ury sustained.7 However, if the injured party dies before 
trial, that party is not entitled to fair and reasonable compensation 
for the degree of injury suffered.s Stated another way, the injured 
party, whose earning potential is diminished by the negligence of a 
tortfeasor, can be fully compensated for that diminution. Yet, the 
victim who dies, having all earning potential eliminated upon death, 
is not entitled to compensation under current Maryland law. This 
inconsistency is illogical: by causing the death of another, the 
tortfeasor's liability is substantially minimized. 
Surprisingly, this inconsistency is mandated under Maryland 
law.9 Damages for future lost earnings are not recoverable by the es-
tate of an i~ured party who died as a result of a tortfeasor's con-
duct. lO Therefore, the decedent's estate is not compensated for the 
decedent's future lost earnings, even though the loss occurred as a 
result of the tortfeasor's conduct. II 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland recently upheld this inequity 
position in Jones v. Flood. 12 In Jones, the court held that a personal 
representative in a survival action may not recover damages for the 
decedent's future lost earnings. 13 This glaring injustice requires a 
thorough examination of the adoption and interpretation of both 
the Maryland survival 14 and wrongful death statutes,15 and the im-
pact the courts' continued reliance on Jones has on injured parties' 
estates. 
This Comment examines the survival and wrongful death stat-
utes by exploring the types of damages recoverable in a survival ac-
tion 16 for personal injuries, and proposes a change in the current 
7. See infra notes 4547 and accompanying text. 
8. See infra note 44 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra note 44. 
10. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
11. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
12. 351 Md. 120, 716 A.2d 285 (1998). 
13. See id. at 131, 716 A.2d at 290. 
14. See MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 6401 (1999) (providing that, "[e]xcept 
as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a cause of action at law, whether 
real, personal, or mixed, survives the death of either party"). 
15. See MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-902 (1999) (providing that "[a]n ac-
tion may be maintained against a person whose wrongful act causes the death 
of another"). 
16. See David W. Leebron, Final Moments: Damages For Pain and Suffering Prior To 
Death, 64 N.YU. L. REv. 256, 261 (1989): 
Survival acts . . . generally have provided that certain of a decedent's 
causes of action survive the death and become the claims of the es-
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application of the law. Part II of this Comment addresses the sur-
vival statute, discussing its purposes and the damages currently re-
coverable under it.17 Part III discusses the wrongful death statute, 
highlighting its purpose and the recoverable damages. IS Part IV pro-
vides a comparison of the nature and purpose of the survival statute 
and the wrongful death statute. 19 Part V discusses the current state 
of the law regarding the recovery of future lost earnings in Mary-
land courts.20 Part VI illustrates how the plain language and legisla-
tive intent of the survival statute is currently ignored.21 Finally, Part 
VII discusses how the perceived problems of double recovery and 
stare decisis should not limit a court's granting of future lost earn-
ings in survival actions.22 
II. THE SURVIVAL STATUTE 
A. Suroival Statutes Generally 
Historically at common law, both in Maryland23 and nation-
tate which the decedent's personal representative may pursue. The 
survival acts were enacted in large part to alleviate the situation in 
which a decedent had initiated and prosecuted a legal action that 
had not proceeded to judgment prior to the death. Upon the death 
of the plaintiff; the case would be dismissed. This practice was unfair 
to the decedent and her heirs and resulted in an undeserved wind-
fall to the defendant .... Damages under these survival acts have in-
cluded medical expenses resulting from the injury, lost income, pain 
and suffering prior to death, and, in some jurisdictions, loss of enjoy-
ment of life. 
[d. A survival action is also defined as "[a] lawsuit brought on behalf of a de-
cedent's estate for injuries or damages incurred by the decedent immediately 
before dying." BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1459 (7th ed. 1999). 
17. See infra notes 22-47 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 48-71 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 72-84 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 85-137 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 138-201 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 202-68 and accompanying text. 
23. See Demczuk v. Jenifer, 138 Md. 488, 490, 114 A. 471, 472 (1921) ("The gen-
eral rule of common law was that, if an injury were done either to the person 
or to the property of another, for which unliquidated damages only could be 
recovered in satisfaction, the action died with the person to whom or by 
whom the wrong was done." (citing HERBERT BROOM, LEGAL MAxIMS 702 (8th 
ed. 1911»); see also Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 
333-34, 65 A. 49, 50 (1906) (holding that the survival statute and wrongful 
death statute are two separate and distinct causes of action which allow for 
separate and distinct recoveries). 
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wide,24 all causes of action initiated by or on behalf of a party en-
ded with the death of that party.25 However, many jurisdictions abro-
gated the common law by enacting what are commonly referred to 
as "survival statutes. "26 Survival statutes provide that claims held by a 
person at death are not extinguished; they may be enforced by an 
action brought by a successor, usually the decedent's personal 
represen tative. 27 
While no general federal survival statute exists,28 almost all fIfty 
states have enacted some form of survival statute.29 The approach of 
the states that have done so can generally be divided into two cate-
gories: (1) those that have entirely rejected the common-law ap-
proach by adopting new rules that presume the survival of claims, 
with some exceptions;30 and (2) those that have acted more con-
servatively by "merely add[ing] categories of actions to those that al-
ready survived the death of the claimant at common law."31 
24. See 1 CJ.S. Abatement and Revival § 117 (1985). It was a principle of common 
law that if a person suffered an injury to either the person or property, for 
which only damages could be the remedy, the cause of action in correlation 
to that injury abates at death. In Latin, this common-law doctrine is actio per-
sonalis moritur cum persona. In English this translates to "a personal right of ac-
tion dies with the person." See Doggett v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply Co., 477 P.2d 
511, 512 (Idaho 1970). 
25. See Doggett, 977 P.2d at 512. 
26. See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
27. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 45 (1982). 
28. See Michael D. Moberly, For Whom The Bell Tolls: A Decedent's Right to § 1983 
Pain and Suffering Damages in the Ninth Circuit, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 409, 413 
(2000). See also Miller v. Apartments & Homes of Nj., 646 F.2d 101, 108 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (noting "the absence of general federal provisions concerning sur-
vival of actions"); Strickland v. Deaconess Hosp., 735 P.2d 74, 77 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1987) (commenting that "no federal survival provision exist[s]"). 
29. See infra note 49. 
30. See ALA. CODE § 6-5-462 (2000) ("[A]ll personal claims upon which an action 
has been filed, except for injuries to the reputation, survive .... "); ALAsKA 
STAT. § 09.55.570 (1999) ("All causes of action ... survive .... "); ARIz. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 14-3110 (West 2000) ("Every cause of action, except [named ex-
ceptions], shall survive .... "); CAL. ClY. PROC. CODE § 377.20(a) (West 2000) 
("Except as otherwise provided by statute, a cause of action ... is not lost by 
reason of the person's death, but survives .... "); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 
13-20-101 (West 2000) ("All cause of action, except actions for slander or libel, 
shall survive .... "); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-599(a) (West 2000) ("A 
cause or right of action shall not be lost or destroyed by the death of any per-
son .... "). 
31. Karen M. Doore, Survival of the Fittest? Waiting Out the Death of the Plaintiff in 
ADA Claims: Allred v. Solaray, Inc., 1998 UTAH L. REv. 371, 377-78 (1998); see 
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B. Maryland s Survival StatutlP 
Maryland follows the trend of the more aggressive states by re-
jecting the common-law approach and adopting a new rule that 
presumes the survival of claims, with an exception for slander. 
1. Development of Maryland's Survival Statute 
The Maryland General Assembly abrogated the common-law 
rule when it enacted its first survival statute in 1785.33 This precur-
sor to the current section 6401 of the Courts and Judicial Proceed-
ings Article provided that, "' [n]o action of ejectment, waste, parti-
tion, dower, replevin, or any personal action, . . . shall abate by the 
death of either or any of the parties to such action . . . this not to 
apply to actions for slander or for i£Uuries to the person.' "34 In a 
special session one year later, the Legislature narrowed the scope of 
"injuries," but broadened the class of "personal actions" that would 
not abate at plaintiff's death-an action deemed necessary by the 
injustices resulting from the Civil War. This class of personal actions 
was further enlarged in 1888 when the General Assembly stated, 
"[n]o action hereafter brought to recover damages for i£Uuries to 
the person by negligence or default shall abate by reason of the 
death of the plaintiff, but the personal representatives of the de-
ceased may be substituted as plaintiff and prosecute the suit to final 
also ARK. CODE ANN. § H).{'i2-101 (a) (West 1999) ("For wrongs done to the per-
son ... an action may be maintained .... "); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 
3704(a) (West 1999) ("No action brought to recover damages for injuries to 
the person ... shall abate .... "); IDAHO CODE § 5-327 (West 2000) ("Causes 
of action arising out of injury to the person ... shall not abate . . . ."). 
32. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6401 (1999). Maryland's survival statute 
provides the following: 
Id. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a cause of 
action at law, whether real, personal, or mixed, survives the death of 
either party. (b) A cause of action for slander abates upon the death 
of either party unless an appeal has been taken from a judgment en-
tered in favor of the plaintiff. (c) A right of action in equity survives 
the death of either party if the court can grant effective relief in 
spite of the death. 
33. The first survival statute enacted by the Maryland Legislature was the Act of 
1785, chapter 80, which abrogated the common-law rule for abatement of cer-
tain actions. 
34. Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 335, 65 A.2d 49, 50 
(1906) (quoting Acts 1785, ch. 80, codified as the Code of 1860, art. 2, § 1). 
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judgment and satisfaction. "35 Inadvertently omitted from the com-
prehensive Maryland Code revision of 1957, the survival statute re-
mained "lost" until a corrective bill was enacted in 1963.36 Fortu-
nately, the code restructure of 1973 placed the statutory provision 
within the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, continuing with 
the same force and effect despite the modification in language.37 In 
1988, the language was altered, becoming the current version, with 
no apparent desire to change the statutory intent.38 However, the 
1988 modification provided for abatement of "actions for injuries to 
the person where the defendant dies, and actions for slander. "39 
2. Damages Recoverable Under Maryland's Survival Statute 
The purpose of Maryland's survival statute is to provide for the 
recovery of damages sustained by the deceased during the dece-
dent's life that would have been recoverable had the deceased sur-
vived.40 A loss to the decedent's estate in a survival action concerns 
only damages sustained by the decedent, not for damages sustained 
by the decedent's relatives.41 
A survival action limits the personal representative to recover-
ing damages that the decedent sustained during the decedent's 
life.42 Maryland courts, however, limit recovery to include only com-
35. Stewart, 104 Md. at 335, 65 A.2d at 51 (quoting the Code of Public General 
Laws of 1888, art. 75, § 25). 
36. See Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 535, 682 A.2d 
1143, 1160 (1996) (noting the re-codification in MD. ANN. CODE, art. 75, § 15B 
(Supp. 1963), with only minor editorial changes including the deletion of the 
word "hereafter" and two extraneous commas». 
37. See id. at 535-36, 682 A.2d at 1160 (noting the revision author's intent). 
38. See id. at 536 n.21, 682 A.2d at 1160 n.21 (noting the change was signed into 
law by the Acts of 1988, ch. 359). 
39. Stewart, 104 Md. at 336, 65 A. at 51 (quoting the Code of Public General Laws 
of 1888, art. 75, § 24, recodified in the Code of 1904). 
40. See id. 
41. See id. at 339-40, 65 A. at 52 (stating that damages under each statute "go into 
different channels and are recovered upon different grounds ... "). 
42. See id. (stating that the damages include those the decedent sustained, but ex-
clude damages sustained by other persons due to the death); see also MD. 
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7-401 (y) (Supp. 1999) (providing that the repre-
sentative may recover funeral expenses if the action is brought against the 
tortfeasor whose wrong resulted in the decedent's death); see also ACandS, 
Inc. v. Asner, 104 Md. App. 608, 645, 657 A.2d 379, 397 (1995) ("Damages in a 
survival action are limited to the damages that would have been recoverable 
by the decedent had he survived, i.e., appropriate compensation for the time 
between injury and death, which includes loss of consortium damages."), rev'd 
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pensation for injury and loss between the time of injury and the 
time of death.43 Such damages include pain and suffering, medical 
expenses, funeral expenses, and lost earnings.44 The courts also al-
on other grounds, 344 Md. 155, 686 A.2d 250 (1996); Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 
223, 230, 167 A.2d 773, 777 (1961) (noting that damages are limited to those 
that might have been recovered by the deceased); Stewart, 104 Md. at 34243, 
65 A. at 53 (same). 
43. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 126, 716 A.2d 285, 288 (1998) (noting that 
Maryland courts have consistently applied the rule that, under the survival 
statute, damages are based on those suffered by the decedent from the date 
of injury until his or her death (citing Monias v. Endal, 330 Md. 274, 279 n.2, 
623 A.2d 656, 658 n.2 (1993) (holding that in a Maryland survival action, fu-
ture earnings are not recoverable»; United States v. Streidel, 329 Md. 533, 
544 n.9, 620 A.2d 905, 909 n.9 (1993) (noting that Maryland's survival statute 
allows for compensation only between the time of injury and time of death); 
Fennell v. Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 320 Md. 776, 792, 580 A.2d 206, 214 
(1990) (commenting that survival action damages include conscious pain and 
suffering, but exclude future loss of earnings); Tri-State Poultry Coop. v. Ca-
rey, 190 Md. 116, 125, 57 A.2d 812, 817 (1948) (stating that the victim must 
have lived after the accident to recover future earnings); White v. Safe De-
posit & Trust Co., 140 Md. 593, 598, 118 A. 77, 79 (1922) (noting that a suit 
for future damages could not be maintained if the person causing the injury 
was dead); ACandS, 104 Md. App. at 645, 657 A.2d at 397-98 (1995) (noting 
that damages in a survival action are limited to those that the decedent could 
have recovered had he survived and therefore compensation is only awarded 
for the time between the injury and death); Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 76 
Md. App. 524,539,547 A.2d 654,661 (1988), vacated on other grounds, 322 Md. 
713, 589 A.2d 956 (1991) (holding that under the survival statute, "the dam-
ages are limited to compensation for the pain and suffering by the deceased, 
his loss of time and his expenses between the time of the injury and his death 
... " (quoting Stewart, 104 Md. at 34243, 65 A. at 49»; Biro v. Schorn bert, 41 
Md. App. 658, 665, 398 A.2d 519, 523, vacated on other grounds, 285 Md. 290, 
402 A.2d 71 (1979) (noting that damages in a survival action are "limited to 
compensation for pain and suffering sustained, expenses incurred, and loss of 
earnings, by the deceased from the time of the infliction of the injury to the 
time of death"). In Jones, the court noted that the Maryland Civil Pattern Jury 
Instructions also embody this rule. See Jones, 351 Md. at 126, 716 A.2d at 288 
(quoting that economic loss is to be considered "[f]rom the time of injury to 
the time of death" (citations omitted». 
44. See Streide~ 329 Md. at 544 n.9, 620 A.2d at 911 n.9 (noting that the survival 
statute allows for loss of earnings and medical expenses); Fennel~ 320 Md. at 
792, 580 A.2d at 214 (observing that damages in a survival action include 
"conscious pain and suffering as well as medical expenses, but exclude future 
loss of earnings, solatium damages, and damages which result to other per-
sons from the death"); Rhone, 224 Md. at 230, 167 A.2d at 777 (explaining 
that damages in a survival action do not include those for the shortening of 
the decedent's life); Biro, 41 Md. App. at 665, 398 A.2d at 523 ("Damages in 
Survival Statute actions are limited to compensation for pain and suffering 
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low the recovery of punitive damages in survival actions.45 There-
fore, under Maryland's survival statute the issue is making the dece-
dent's estate whole, not whether the decedent's relatives are entitled 
to any benefit. 
III. THE WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE 
A. Wrongful Death Statutes Generally 
The purpose underlying wrongful death statutes is to provide 
the decedent's relatives with recovery for lost support or benefits 
that would have been provided to them had the decedent not died 
as a result of another's negligence.46 Wrongful death statutes can be 
traced to England's enactment of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846 in 
recognition of the injustice created by the absence of a remedy for 
wrongful death.47 The United States soon followed, with New York 
enacting the first wrongful death statute in 1847.48 Currently, all fifty 
states have enacted statutes providing a cause of action to remedy 
wrongful death.49 Further, while most jurisdictions have a general 
sustained, expenses incurred, and loss of earnings .... "). The Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland recently included loss of consortium damages as ap-
propriate compensation for an injury recoverable in a survival action. See 
ACandS, 104 Md. App. at 645, 657 A.2d at 397-98 (explaining that loss of con-
sortium damages are recoverable in a survival action and holding that the de-
cedent's death does not terminate the entitlement to damages). 
45. See Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 160, 297 A.2d 721, 727 
(1972) (" '[I]f a wrongdoer may be punished if his victim lives, then surely he 
should not escape retribution if his wrongful act causes a death.'" (quoting 
Leahy v. Morgan, 275 F. Supp. 424, 425 (E.D. Iowa 1967), overruled on other 
grounds, Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992»). 
The court in Zenobia moved from a presumed malice to an actual malice stan-
dard when punitive damages are at issue. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 459, 601 A.2d 
at 652. 
46. See ACandS, 104 Md. App. at 64445, 657 A.2d at 397-98; Stewart, 104 Md. at 
33840, 65 A. at 52. 
47. See STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY § 1:8 
(3d ed. 1992). "Thus, Lord Campbell's Act created a new cause of action 
based upon the defendant's wrongful act, neglect or default, limited recovery 
to certain beneficiaries, and measured damages with respect to the loss suf-
fered by these beneficiaries." Id. 
48. See id. § 1:9. 
49. See id.; see also ALA. CODE §§ 6-2-38(a),(0), 6-5410, 411, 462 (1993) (maintain-
ing that actions by personal representatives to recover damages for a wrongful 
act, omission, or negligence causing the decedent's death, or for damage to 
decedent's death is permissible so long as commenced within two years from 
death); ALAsKA STAT. §§ 09.55.570, .580 (Michie 1998) (providing causes of ac-
tion, other than defamation, to survive to the personal representative of the 
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decedent and permitting initiation of a wrongful death action by the estate); 
ARIz. REv. STAT. §§ 12-542 (two-year limitation), 12-551 (product liability), 12-
611 (liability), 12-612 (named parties), 12-613 (measure of damages), 14-3110 
(causes of action survive) (1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-62-101, -102 (Michie 
1987 & Supp.) (allowing survival of actions except libel and slander to survive 
the death of decedent and providing for wrongful death actions to be 
brought by the estate); CAL. Crv. PRO. CODE §§ 340, 377.20-.21, .30-.31, .34-.35, 
.40-.43, .60-.62 (West 1982) (stating that wrongful death actions must be 
brought within one year, actions may survive after a person's death, and may 
be brought by the decedent's successor in interest); COL. REv. STAT. §§ 13-20-
101, 13-21-202, 13-80-102 (1997) (allowing all causes of action, other than libel 
or slander, to be brought or continued despite death of a party within two 
years after the cause of action accrues); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-555, -599 
(1991) (permitting a cause of action to survive the decedent's death); DEL. 
CaNST. art. 4, § 23 (allowing actions to survive death of party), DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 3701, 3707, 3722, 3724-35, 8107 (1999) (stating actions survive 
and may be initiated after death of a party unless for defamation, malicious 
prosecution, or upon penal statutes, and may be maintained against a person 
whose wrongful act causes the death of another); D.G CODE ANN. §§ 12-101, 
16-2701, 16-2702, 20-741 (1997) (allowing the right to bring a cause of action 
to survive the decedent); FLA. STAT. A,"IN. §§ 46.021, 95.11(4)(d), 768.19-.27 
(West 1997) (permitting actions to survive the death of a party and for wrong-
ful death actions to be brought within two years); GA CODE ANN. §§ 9-241, 9-
3-33, 514-1, 514-2, 51-4-5 (1982) (stating actions for wrongful death may be 
brought by the surviving spouse, child, or personal representative of the dece-
dent for wrongful death within two years); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 663-3 to -8 
(1993 & Supp. 1999) (providing the personal representative to bring an ac-
tion for wrongful death and actions survive death of either party); IDAHO 
CODE §§ 5-311, 5-319, 5-327 (Michie 1998) (stating that actions for wrongful 
death by or against the estate is permitted and actions survive notwithstanding 
death of a party); 740 ILL. CaMP. STAT. 180/2, 5/27-6 (1993) (permitting ac-
tions to survive the death of a party); IND. CODE §§ 34-1-2-7, 34-9-3-1 to -5, 34-
11-7-1, 34-23-1-1 (1998) (allowing actions to survive the death of the decedent 
and be brought within 18 months of the date of death and wrongful death ac-
tions to be brought); IOWA CODE §§ 611.20-.22, 613.15, 633.336 (1999) (permit-
ting all causes of action to survive the' death of a party and initiation of 
wrongful death actions); RAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-513, 60-1801-02, 60-1802, 60-
1901 to -1903 (1994 & Supp. 1999) (stating causes of action survive the death 
of a party and actions may be brought for wrongful death); Ky. CaNST. §§ 54, 
241 (limiting the legislature from restricting recoveries for death or injury 
and allowing recovery for wrongful death); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 395.270, 
411.130,411.140,413.140 (Banks-Baldwin 1995) (providing for the recovery of 
damages for wrongful death and allowing actions to survive the death of the 
injured party); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 2315.1-.2 (West 1997) (permitting ac-
tions to survive the death of the injured party for one year as well as wrongful 
death actions); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 2-804, 3-817(a) (West 1998) (al-
lowing wrongful death and survival of actions); MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. §§ 3-901 to -904, 6401 (1998) (providing actions to survive despite 
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death, as well as wrongful death actions); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 228, §§ 1, 
4, ch. 229, §§ 1-2, 6, ch. 230, §§ 1-2, 4 (1998) (allowing wrongful death and 
survival of actions); MICH. COMPo LAws §§ 600.2921-.2922, 600.5805 (1987) (per-
mitting survival of actions after the death of a party and wrongful death ac-
tions to be initiated); MINN. STAT. § 573.02 (1998 & Supp. 1999) (permitting 
actions arising from death by a wrongful act to be maintained); MISS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 11-7-13, 91-7-233, 91-7-235, 91-7-237 (1999) (permitting the personal 
representative to bring a wrongful death action and for continuance of ac-
tions despite death of a party); Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 537.020, 537.080 (1988) 
(continuing actions for personal injuries or death despite death of a party 
and allowing wrongful death actions); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-323, -501, -
502, -513 (1999) (allowing for both survival of actions upon death of a party 
and wrongful death claims); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-1402, 25-1405, 25-1410, 25-
1411, 25-1413, 25-1414, 30-809, 30-810 (1995) (permitting continuation of 
claims and initiation of wrongful death actions); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 12.100, 
41.085, 41.100, 41.130 (1998 & Supp. 1999) (allowing survival of actions de-
spite death of a party and wrongful death action); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 
556:7, 556:9 to :15 (1997) (allowing survival of actions despite death of a party 
and wrongful death action); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:15-3 to 4, 2A:31-1 to -6 
(West 1998) (permitting actions to survive despite a parties death, as well as 
recovery for wrongful death); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-2-1, 41-2-1 to 4 (Michie 
1996 & Supp. 1999) (providing recovery for wrongful death and survival of 
claims notwithstanding the death of a party); NY CONST. art. I, § 16 (permit-
ting continuation of actions despite death), N.Y C.P.L.R. 210, 214 (McKinney 
1990) (permitting actions to survive the death of a party so long as it is within 
the three-year statute of limitations), N.Y EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAw §§ 54.1, 
11-3.2 (1999) (permitting wrongful death action and survival of action despite 
death); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-53, 28A-18-1, 28A-18-2 (1999) (recovering for 
wrongful death permitted within two years of the date of death and most ac-
tions survive the death of a party); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-01-26.1, 32-21-01 to 
-06 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (permitting survival of claims within the statute of 
limitations despite death of a party and recovery for wrongful death); OHIO 
REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2125.01-.02, 2305.21,2317.421 (Anderson 1994) (allowing 
claims for wrongful death and survival of actions); OKlA. STAT. tit. 12 §§ 1051-
55 (1998) (providing for continuation of causes of actions regardless of death 
of a party and permitting actions for wrongful death); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 
30.020, 30.075, 30.080 (1999) (permitting actions to survive death of a party 
and recovery for wrongful death); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3373, tit. 42 §§ 
2202, 8301-02 (West 1998) (allowing for actions to survive the death of a party 
and for wrongful death claims); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 9-1-6 to -8, 10-7-1 to -13 
(1997 & Supp. 1999) (permitting actions that survive the death of a party and 
compensate for wrongful death); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-51-10, 15-51-20, 15-5140 
to 42, 15-51-60 (Law. Co-op. 1977) (allowing recovery for wrongful death and 
continuation of action despite death of party); S.D. CODmED LAws §§ 15-4-1, 
15-4-2, 15-6-25(a), 21-5-2 to -9 (Michie 1987) (continuing actions regardless of 
death of a party and affording compensation for wrongful death); TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 20-5-101 to -113 (1994) (permitting wrongful death actions and sur-
vival of actions despite death of a party); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. 
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wrongful death statute, some jurisdictions also provide statutory 
remedies for specific situations. 50 
Because of the statutes' diversity, it is nearly impossible to 
group them into clearly defined categories. Even statutes originally 
enacted in the United States with similar wording have undergone 
quite different judicial constructions.51 However, two broad catego-
ries of state wrongful death statutes have emerged.52 The first cate-
gory includes those tracking Lord Campbell's Act, creating a new 
cause of action for designated persons or for the decedent's per-
sonal representative.53 This type of wrongful death statute attempts 
to compensate designated beneficiaries for their loss resulting from 
the victim's death.54 
The second category is "'survival-type' wrongful death statutes 
[that] simply continue the cause of action for tortious injury that 
the decedent would have possessed, but for death. "55 Again, this sur-
vival-type statute varies regarding who may initiate the action,56 but 
the intent is to compensate the loss to the decedent's estate.57 
§§ 71.001-.0011, 71.021 (Vernon 1997) (allowing actions to survive death of a 
party and recovery for wrongful death); UTAH CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (prohibit-
ing abrogation of an action because of death of a party), UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 
78-11-7, -12 (1996) (allowing for recovery of wrongful death of an adult and 
survival of action); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1452-53, 1491-92 (1989) (permit-
ting recovery for wrongful death and continuation of action regardless of 
death of party); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-25, 8.01-50 to -64 (Michie 1998) (pro-
viding for continuation of an action regardless of death of a party and for 
wrongful death recovery); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.20.005, .010, .020, .046, .050, 
.060 (1988) (recovering for wrongful death and survival of action despite 
death of a party permitted); W. VA. CODE §§ 55-2-18, 55-7-5 to -8a, 56-8-1 to -2 
(1997 & Supp. 1999) (providing survival of action and assertion of wrongful 
death claims); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 777.01, 893.22, 893.54, 895.Q1 (West 1997) 
(permitting recovery for wrongful death and continuation of actions despite 
death of a party). 
50. See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 47, §§ 1:14-1:17 (discussing specific state idiosyn-
cracies in addition to more common specialized statutes for worker's compen-
sation, dram shop recovery, and uninsured motorist protection). 
51. See id. § 15:8. 
52. See C. Frederick Overby & Jason Crawford, The Case for Allowing Punitive Dam-
ages in Georgia Wrongful Death Actions: The Need to Remove an Unjust Anomaly in 
Georgia Law, 45 MERCER L. REv. 1,9 (1993). 
53. See id. 
54. See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 47, § 1:9. 
55. Overby & Crawford, supra note 52, at 9. 
56. See id. at 9 (allowing an action in the name of the estate or an action by desig-
nated persons such as the surviving spouse or children). 
57. See SPEISER ET AL., supra note 47, § 1:9. 
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B. Maryland s Wrongful Death Statute 
Maryland's wrongful death statute allows particular relatives58 of 
a victim who died as a result of a tortfeasor's conduct to bring a 
cause of action for injuries to them as a result of the death.59 As 
such, it follows the first broad category of wrongful death statutes.60 
The damages recoverable under a wrongful death claim include pe-
cuniary losses to the claimant as a result of the decedent's death, 
such as medical and funeral expenses, emotional pain and suffer-
ing, and loss of support, as well as non-pecuniary damages.61 
C. Future Lost Earnings 
1. Generally 
Under both wrongful death and survival action statutes, a per-
son should be able to recover future lost earnings. Future lost earn-
58. Maryland's wrongful death statute provides which relatives may bring a wrong-
ful death action and separates this into primary and secondary beneficiaries. 
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 3-904 (1998) ("Action for wrongful 
death"). First, primary beneficiaries, defined as a wife, husband, parent, or a 
child of the deceased person, may bring a wrongful death action. See id. If no 
one qualifies as a primary beneficiary, then a secondary beneficiary may bring 
the action. A secondary beneficiary is defined as "any person related to the 
deceased person by blood or marriage who was substantially dependent upon 
the deceased." Id. § 3-904(b). 
59. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 3-904 (1998) (delineating which rela-
tives may bring a wrongful death action and laying out the damages that may 
be recovered). Maryland's wrongful death statute is essentially an adoption of 
a statute from England historically known as the Lord Campbell's Act. See 
Stewart V. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 334, 65 A.49, 50 
(1906) (tracing the history of the adoption of Maryland's wrongful death stat-
ute). Maryland adopted Lord Campbell's Act under the Act of 1852, chapter 
299. See id. 
60. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
61. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 3-903 (1998). The statute expressly 
states that the damages recoverable "may include damages for mental 
anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, com-
fort, protection, marital care, paternal care, filial care, attention, advice, coun-
sel, training, guidance, or education .... " [d. § 3-904(d). See, e.g., Carolina 
Freight Carriers Corp. V. Keane, 311 Md. 335, 336-37, 534 A.2d 1337, 1338 
(1988) (awarding solatium damages, damages allowed for the injury to the 
feelings, to parents for the loss of their child); Ory V. Libersky, 40 Md. App. 
151, 156, 166-67, 389 A.2d 922, 926, 931 (1978) (affirming a trial judge's in-
struction that allowed the jury to consider whether children would be entitled 
to damages, such as, the cost of higher education, mental anguish, emotional 
pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, and guidance due to the 
loss of their father). 
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ings are defined as "[t]he amount of money the decedent would 
have earned had he lived out his normal life expectancy. "62 Calcula-
tion of future lost earnings is not exact; it requires some specula-
tion about the decedent's life expectancy and potential work experi-
ence. 63 Although somewhat predictable when the individual 
works,64 the subjectivity is enhanced when the individual has never 
worked or is currently unemployed.65 
2. Maryland 
Damages for future lost earnings are recoverable in a personal 
injury action as provided for under section 11-109 of the Courts and 
Judicial Proceedings Article.66 A future lost earnings award is al-
lowed for those amounts reasonably certain to result from the in-
jury.67 For judicial simplicity, the award is usually allocated in a 
lump sum.68 The amount awarded must be based upon present 
value and not upon speculation about inflation or other unknown 
factors impacting earning potential.69 
62. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 47, § 3:50. 
63. See id. 
64. See generally Michael T. Brody, Inflation, Productivity, and the Total Offset Method 
of Calculating Damages for Lost Future Earnings, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 1003 (1982) 
(referring to consideration of factors such as "age, occupation, education, and 
actuarial probability of survival" for predicting future wages). 
65. Maryland allows recovery for lost future wages for a minor child. See Johns 
Hopkins Hosp. v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 689, 697 A.2d 1358, 1363 (1997) (de-
ciding upon the extent of damages sustained by an infant who underwent 
open heart surgery at the age of four months). The exhaustive exploration of 
various factors to consider in calculating lost future earnings is beyond the 
scope of this Comment. 
66. See MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-109 (1998). The statute addressing 
the damages allowed includes the following: 
a. (1) In this section, "economic damages" means loss of earnings 
and medical expenses. (2)"Economic damages" does not include pu-
nitive damages. b. As part of the verdict in any action for damages 
for personal injury in which the cause of action arises on or after 
July 1, 1986 or for wrongful death in whidl the cause of action arises 
on or after October 1, 1994, the trier of tact shall itemize the award 
to reflect the monetary amount intended for: (1) Past medical ex-
penses; (2) Future medical expenses; (3) Past loss of earnings; (4) 
Future loss of earnings; (5) Noneconomic damages; and (6) Other 
damages. 
[d. (emphasis added). 
67. See Brooks v. Fairman, 253 Md. 471, 252 A.2d 865 (1969). 
68. See Scott v. James Gibbons Co., 192 Md. 319, 331 A.2d 117 (1949). 
69. See Baublitz v. Henz, 73 Md. App. 538, 550-51, 535 A.2d 497, 501 (1988) (rea-
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IV. COMPARISON OF MARYLAND'S SURVIVAL AND WRONG-
FUL DEATH STATUTES 
While both Maryland's survival statute and wrongful death stat-
ute provide damages to individuals as a result of a single tortious 
act, each have separate purposes, separate causes of action, and sep-
arate treatments of damages. These differences are crucial to under-
standing how Maryland's case law has gone so far afield of what the 
statutes were designed to compensate for. 
A. Separate Purposes 
The wrongful death statute and the survival statute were en-
acted for distinct purposes. The actions are by different persons, 
"the damages go into different channels and are recovered upon 
different grounds, and the causes of action, though growing out of 
the same wrongful act or neglect, are entirely distinct. "70 The pur-
pose of the wrongful death statute is to provide the decedent's rela-
tives with an award for the lost support that they would have re-
ceived had the decedent not died as a result of a tortfeasor's 
negligence.71 Whereas, the purpose of the survival statute is to pro-
vide for the recovery of damages, sustained by the decedent in life, 
which the decedent could have recovered had he survived.72 
B. Separate Causes of Action Under Each Claim· 
A wrongful death action and a survival action, though growing 
out of the same wrongful or negligent act, are two distinct causes of 
action.13 An action for wrongful death is a cause of action, created 
by statute, that can be brought by relatives of the decedent,74 while 
a survival action is an existing cause of action that survives the dece-
dent and can be pursued by the personal representative on the de-
cedent's behalf.75 
C. Separate Treatment of Damages Under Each Statute 
In Maryland, courts maintain a clear distinction between a sur-
vival action and a wrongful death action to ensure there exists no 
soning that the court of appeals would agree with this conclusion). 
70. Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 339, 65 A. 49, 52 
(1906). 
71. See id. at 338-40, 65 A. at 52. 
72. See supra note 40. 
73. See Stewart, 104 Md. at 340, 65 A. at 52. 
74. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
75. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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overlap of damages.76 Therefore, the damages awarded under each 
action shall be considered separately, and any discussion of dam-
ages under the survival statute may not include those damages re-
coverable under the wrongful death statute.77 
When an individual injured by the negligence of another dies 
prior to bringing a personal injury action, all claims brought under 
the survival statute, including claims for personal injuries, survive 
that individual's death.78 A survival action may also be initiated by 
the decendent's personal representative on behalf of the estate after 
the decendent's death as if the decedent survived.19 However, if the 
injured victim survived and lived throughout the pendency of the 
suit, the victim could receive future lost earnings as part of a dam-
age award.80 According to the current practice of Maryland courts, 
76. See Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. Chung, 76 Md. App. 524, 538, 547 A.2d 654, 660 
(1988). The Globe court noted that Maryland has been pointed to "as a juris-
diction that meticulously distinguishes the damages in a survival action from 
the damages in a wrongful death action, thereby avoiding the problem of du-
plication in the element of damages." Id. (citing Bowen E. Schumacher, Rights 
of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 23 MICH. L. REv. 114, 126 (1924»; 
Stewart, 104 Md. at 339-40, 65 A.2d at 52 ("Under the [wrongful death statute] 
the damages recoverable are such as the equitable plaintiffs have sustained by 
the death of the party injured. Under [the survival statute] the damages re-
coverable are only such as the deceased sustained in his lifetime, and conse-
quently exclude those which result to other persons from his death. Under 
the [wrongful death statute] the damages are apportioned by the jury among 
the equitable plaintiffs, and belong exclusively to them, and form no part of 
the assets of the decedent's estate. Under the [survival statute] the damages 
recovered go in to the hands of the executor or administrator and constitute 
assets of the estate. The cause of action is created by [the death], and is a 
new cause of action, and consequently one which the deceased never had. 
Under the [survival statute] there is a survival of a cause of action which the 
decedent had in his lifetime."). 
77. See Stewart, 104 Md. at 340-41, 65 A. at 53. The court in Stewart further points 
out that even though the causes of action flow from the same cause, the same 
act may injure different individuals in different ways and each of those indi-
viduals should have separate remedies for the recovery of damages sustained 
by them. See id. at 340, 65 A. at 52. 
78. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6-401 (1998) (enumerating when ac-
tions survive at law and in equity). 
79. See MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7-401 (y) (Supp. 1999) ("He may prose-
cute, defend, or submit to arbitration actions, claims, or proceedings in any 
appropriate jurisdiction for the protection or benefit of the estate, including 
the commencement of a personal action which the decedent might have com-
menced or prosecuted .... "). 
80. See Monias v. Endal, 330 Md. 274, 280-81, 623 A.2d 656, 659 (1993) (stating 
that, in a personal injury action, a plaintiff may recover damages "for loss of 
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however, the decedent's estate may not recover future lost earnings 
in a survival action.8 ! 
V. MARYLAND COURTS' VIEW OF FUTURE LOST EARNINGS 
Various court decisions in Maryland led to the recent holding 
by the court of appeals in Jones v. Flood.82 In Jones, the court held 
that future lost earnings are not recoverable by a decedent's estate 
in a survival action for personal injuries.83 One such case leading to 
the conclusion in Jones is Stewart v. United Electric Light & Power Co. 84 
In Stewart, the court of appeals laid the foundation upon which all 
other cases rely with regard to recovery under the survival statute.85 
A. The State of the Law Beginning With Stewart v. United Electric 
Light & Power Company 
The court in Stewart decided whether both a wrongful death ac-
tion and a survival action may be pursued concurrently when each 
flows from the same wrongful act.86 Stewart involved an action by an 
estate administrator to recover damages due to the defendant's neg-
ligence.87 The decedent, a professional tinner and roofer, received 
an electric shock when he came into contact with charged wires 
while working for the defendants.88 He was thrown to the ground, 
seriously injured, and suffered for a number of hours before even-
tually dying.89 The single question before the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals was whether the cause of action, which accrued in the dece-
dent's lifetime from the alleged negligence of the defendants, 
abated when he died or survived enabling his administrator to 
future earnings which will reasonably and probably result from the tort"); see 
also Adams v. Benson, 208 Md. 261, 270-71, 117 A.2d 881, 885 (1955) (holding 
that plaintiff may recover for any damages which certainly or reasonably re-
sulted as a proximate consequence from the tort). 
81. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text; see also Monias, 330 Md. at 279 & 
n.2, 623 A.2d at 658 & n.2 (stating that lost future earnings are not recover-
able in a survival action in Maryland). 
82. 351 Md. 120, 716 A.2d 285 (1998). 
83. See id. at 131, 716 A.2d at 290. 
84. 104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49 (1906). 
85. See id. at 339, 65 A. at 52 (holding that, under the abatement and wrongful 
death statutes, there are two separate and distinct causes of action arising out 
of the same wrongful act). 
86. See id. at 340, 65 A. at 52. 
87. See id. at 333, 65 A. at 49. 
88. See id. at 333, 65 A. at 49-50. 
89. See id. at 333, 65 A. at 50. 
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maintain a suit.90 
The court thoroughly discussed both the wrongful death statute 
and the survival statute,91 clarifYing the scope of the survival statute 
and the damages recoverable under it.92 It explained that the estate 
may recover only those damages that the decedent could have re-
covered had he survived and instituted the action himself,93 and 
limited the recovery in a survival action to losses sustained between 
the decedent's time of injury and the time of death.94 The court 
created this limitation in order to prevent an overlap of damages 
with those recoverable under the wrongful death statute.95 With this 
decision, the Stewart court created a common-law rule that contra-
dicted the legislative intent of the survival statute and the personal 
representative statute.96 Unfortunately, this remains the rule of law 
in Maryland and has been relied upon in subsequent decisions 
prohibiting the recovery of future lost earnings. 
B. Stewart s Progeny 
Since Stewart, Maryland courts apply its rule to determine the 
recoverability of certain damages in a survival action for personal in-
juries.97 In fact, the court of special appeals, in Biro v. Schombert,98 
looked to Stewart when asked to decide whether future lost earnings 
were recoverable in a survival action. 
90. See id. 
91. See id. at 333-43, 65 A. at 50-53 (discussing the law in Maryland as it was settled 
in 1852 and its roots in English common law). 
92. See id. at 342-43, 65 A. at 53 (stating that determination of damages requires 
close observance of the nature of the statute under which the action is 
brought). 
93. See id. 
94. See id. (identifying as compensable the deceased's pain and suffering, loss of 
time, and expenses between the time of injury and death). 
95. See id. at 344, 65 A. at 54 (stating that to prevent defendants from being ex-
posed to a danger of injustice, meaning double recovery, the damages under 
the survival statute must be limited to those sustained between the time of in-
jury and the time of death). 
96. See supra Part VI.A for a discussion of how Stewart contradicts the plain and 
clear language of the two statutes. 
97. See, e.g., Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 126, 716 A.2d 285, 288 (1998) (acknowl-
edging that under the survival statute, damages are limited to compensation 
for pain and suffering, loss of time, and expenses between the time of injury 
and death (quoting Stewart, 104 Md. at 343, 65 A. at 53»; ACandS, Inc. v. 
Asner, 104 Md. App. 608, 645, 657 A.2d 379, 397 (1995). 
98. 41 Md. App. 658, 398 A.2d 519 (1979), vacated on other grounds, 285 Md. 290, 
402 A.2d 71 (1979). 
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1. Biro v. Schombert 
In Biro, the parents and personal representatives of a twenty 
year old boy killed in a head-on collision brought suit against the 
driver of the other automobile for both wrongful death and survival 
actions.99 The trial court granted partial summary judgment as to 
the future damages claim, limiting recovery to $2000 for funeral 
expenses. 100 
The single issue raised on appeal was whether the personal rep-
resentative of the decedent's estate could recover for future lost 
earnings in a survival action brought by the personal representa-
tive. 101 The court made it clear that the limitation imposed by Stew-
art was proper and dispositive of the issue. 102 Thus, the court held 
future lost earnings are not recoverable in a survival action because 
they do not accrue before the time of death. 103 
In addition, the Biro court, in dicta, addressed the argument 
raised by the appellant that it is unjust to disallow recovery by a de-
cedent's estate for future lost earnings when the person is killed by 
another's negligent conduct. I04 The appellants unsuccessfully argued 
that, under current Maryland law, a tortfeasor who kills another 
person is liable for a smaller amount of damages than if the 
tortfeasor were only to injure that person. !Os 
The court gave two reasons why the appellant's claim was inva-
lid. 106 First, the appellants, parents of the deceased, and others in 
their position, are not without a remedy.107 The court illustrated 
that the Maryland legislature, in passing the wrongful death statute, 
99. See id. at 659, 398 A.2d at 520. 
100. See id. at 660, 398 A.2d at 520. 
101. See id. at 660, 398 A.2d at 52!. 
102. See id. at 665-66, 398 A.2d at 524 (stating that there is no valid claim for loss of 
future earnings because the clear message of Stewart is that an estate may only 
recover losses sustained between time of injury and death). 
103. See id. at 666, 398 A.2d at 524 (reasoning that there can be no valid claim by 
the estate for the loss of future earnings if the claim ceases to accrue as of 
the time of death). 
104. See id. (noting that the parents of the deceased are not without remedy and 
that the Legislature has had numerous opportunities to change the law if the 
Stewart decision was inconsistent with legislative intent). 
105. This is because someone who is only injured may bring an action for personal 
injury themselves and recover loss of future earnings. See id. (noting the ap-
pellant's suggestion that under existing law, "it is cheaper to kill than to in-
jure"). 
106. See id. 
107. See id. 
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gave certain persons the right to maintain a suit for the loss suf-
fered as a result of the wrongful death of another.108 
Second, the Biro court stated that, since the Maryland Legisla-
ture had not overturned the Stewart decision by statutory enactment, 
the Legislature must have intended exactly what the Stewart court 
held. 109 However, it was not until the court's decision in Biro that 
the effects of this limitation on recovery surfaced and led to unjust 
results. Before Biro, there was no reason for the Legislature to mod-
ify the holding in Stewart with a statutory enactment. Interestingly, 
the Biro holding was short-lived; the court of appeals vacated it be-
cause the court of special appeals had no authority to hear the ap-
peal on its merits. IIO 
2. Jones v. Flood 
It was not until 1997 in Jones v. Flood,111 that an appellate court 
in Maryland again addressed whether a personal representative may 
recover future lost earnings in a survival action brought on behalf 
of the deceased for personal injuries caused by the wrongful act of 
another.1I2 For many of the same reasons given by the court in Biro, 
the Jones court rejected the personal representative's claims.1I3 
In Jones, the personal representative of a motorist killed in a 
collision with a county vehicle brought a survival action. 114 The cir-
cuit court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the 
ground that the plaintiff could not recover damages for future lost 
earnings and awarded funeral and medical expenses only. 115 
108. See id. (explaining that the common-law concept of no recovery by anyone ex-
cept the injured party was wisely remedied by the Legislature which provided 
in the statute that the wife, husband, parent, or child can maintain a wrong-
ful death suit). 
109. See Biro, 41 Md. App. at 666-67, 398 A.2d at 524 (stating that because the Leg-
islature has not changed the Stewart decision through further statutory enact-
ments, one can only conclude that the Legislature meant what the Stewart 
court said it meant). 
110. See Biro v. Schombert, 285 Md. 290, 297, 402 A.2d 71, 75 (1979) (holding that 
the circuit court had no authority to make its decision final and appealable). 
Where the appellate court had no authority to hear the appeal on its merits, 
it is improper to rely upon the opinion therein and assert the opinion as sup-
port for the issue raised therein. See Eastgate Assocs. v. Apper, 276 Md. 698, 
704,350 A.2d 661, 665 (1976). 
111. 118 Md. App. 217, 702 A.2d 440 (1997). 
112. See id. at 220, 702 A.2d at 441. 
113. See supra notes 101'{)9 and accompanying text. 
114. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 122, 716 A.2d 285, 286 (1998). 
115. See Jones, 118 Md. App. at 219, 702 A.2d at 441. 
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The decision by the court of special appeals, upholding sum-
mary judgment, was erroneous for two reasons. First, the court re-
lied on its holding in Biro that future lost earnings are not recover-
able by a personal representative in a survival action. 116 It was 
improper for the court of special appeals to do so because the deci-
sion was vacated by the court of appeals. 1I7 Second, the court also 
relied upon Stewart's interpretation of the scope of recovery under 
the survival statute,1I8 erroneously concluding that because future 
lost earnings are recoverable under the wrongful death statute, 
those damages are not recoverable in a survival action. 1I9 
One year later, the Court of Appeals of Maryland heard this 
case as one of first impression. 12o The court, relying heavily on the 
legal conclusions in Stewart,121 held that future lost earnings are not 
recoverable in a survival action. 122 
The court of appeals repeated the doctrine created by the Stew-
art court, that the survival statute limits the recovery of damages to 
only those sustained between the time of injury and the time of 
death. 123 The court used this judicially-created doctrine to exclude 
recovery of any future lost earnings. 124 
Additionally, the Jones court adopted the notion that the estate 
of a person tortiously killed is not, and never has been, a benefici-
ary of damages for wrongful death.125 Therefore, the court reasoned 
that a personal representative's claim for future lost earnings is an 
116. See id. at 221, 702 A.2d at 442. 
117. See supra note 110. 
118. See Jones, 118 Md. App. at 221, 702 A.2d at 442 (limiting damages under the 
statute to pain and suffering, loss of time, and expenses between the time of 
injury and death). 
119. See id. at 224, 702 A.2d at 443 ("Because damages for future loss of earnings 
. . . may be recovered in a wrongful death action as the pecuniary value of 
the life of the decedent, those damages are not recoverable in a survival ac-
tion."). 
120. SeeJones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120,716 A.2d 285 (1998). 
121. See id. at 126, 716 A.2d at 288 (noting that Maryland courts have consistently 
applied the survival statute in accordance with the Stewart construction, that 
is, that it applies to pre-death harms only). 
122. See id. at 131, 716 A.2d at 290 (concluding that "[iJf ... the injured person is 
killed instantly, there are no future lost earnings damages in the survival ac-
tion"). 
123. See id. (citing Stewart as support for proposition that damages are limited to 
pain and suffering, and loss of time and expenses between the time of injury 
and death). 
124. See id. 
125. See id. at 128, 716 A.2d at 289. 
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"end run around"126 the limitation imposed by the wrongful death 
act, whereby only a certain class of individuals may benefit from an 
award of wrongful death damages-an element of which is future 
lost earnings. 127 The court emphasized that if a claim for future lost 
earnings was to survive, no limitation on the class of potential bene-
ficiaries would exist. 128 
Further, the court held that allowing an estate to recover future 
lost earnings in a survival action would yield a double recovery.129 
This was based on the premise that the award would not be an ac-
curate assessment of the amount the estate would have been en-
riched by the future earnings. 130 The court reasoned that an award 
to the estate for future lost earnings would not take into account 
the amount of money the decedent would have spent on the dece-
dent's own personal expenses and for the support of others.131 
Finally, the Jones court erroneously concluded that since future 
lost earnings are recoverable under the wrongful death statute, 
those damages are not recoverable in a survival action.132 Unfortu-
nately, the Jones court fell into the very trap warned of earlier, that 
the wrongful death statute and the survival statute provide for two 
separate causes of action. 133 Because the losses recovered under 
each are distinct, damages recovered under one statute cannot pre-
clude recovery under the other. 134 
126. See id. 
127. See id. at 128-29, 716 A.2d at 289. 
128. See id. at 129, 716 A.2d at 289 (stating that the class of persons who may sue 
for post-death earnings would extend far beyond the relationships specified in 
the wrongful death statute). 
129. See id. (stating that allowing recovery for future lost earnings would duplicate 
the damages awarded in a wrongful death action). 
130. See id. at 129-30, 716 A.2d at 289-90. 
131. See id. 
132. See Jones, 118 Md. App. at 224, 702 A.2d at 443 ("Because damages for future 
"loss of earnings . . . may be recovered in a wrongful death action measured as 
the pecuniary value of the life of the decedent, those damages are not recov-
erable in a survival action."). 
133. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 342, 65 A. 49, 50 
(1906). 
134. See supra Part VI for a discussion of the distinction between wrongful death 
damages and survival damages; recovery under one does not preclude recov-
ery under the other. 
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VI. MARYLAND SHOULD PERMIT DAMAGES FOR FUTURE 
LOST EARNINGS IN A SURVIVAL ACTION 
Several reasons exist why Maryland should permit recovery of 
future lost earnings in survival actions. Primarily, given the plain 
and clear language of the statute, Maryland courts cannot disregard 
the cardinal rule of statutory construction which provides that if the 
language of a statute is unambiguous, it must be followed. In addi-
tion r the legislative intent is clear that future lost earnings are to be 
included in damages recoverable under Maryland's survival statute. 
As support for these propositions, other jurisdictions adhere to 
these principles with similarly worded survival statutes. Finally, pub-
lic policy demands that to avoid UI~ust results, survival action 
awards must include future lost earnings. 
A. The Plain and Clear Language of the Statutes Should be Followed 
Regarding the courts' limitation on recoverable damages and 
on actions surviving the decedent's death, it must be noted that it is 
beyond the courts' judicial power to "disregard the natural import 
of words with a view toward making the statute express an intention 
which is different from its plain meaning."135 However, beginning 
with Stewart v. United Electric Light & Power CO.,136 and ending with 
the recent decision in Jones v. Flood, I37 Maryland courts have not ad-
hered to this cardinal rule of statutory construction.138 Instead, they 
have limited the types of damages recoverable in a survival action 
and effectively limited the causes of action that survive the death of 
the injured party.139 This refusal to adhere to canons of statutory 
construction results from the courts' effort to prevent duplicating 
damages. l40 However, neither the Stewart court, nor any subsequent 
135. Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust, 273 Md. 58, 66, 327 A.2d 483, 487 
(1974). 
136. 104 Md. 332, 65 A. 49 (1906). 
137. 351 Md. 120, 716 A.2d 285 (1998). 
138. See supra Part VA-C. 
139. See generally Jones, 351 Md. at 125, 716 A.2d at 287 (holding that an estate may 
not recover damages for future lost earnings in a survival action); Stewart, 104 
Md. at 343, 65 A. at 53 (holding that the damages recoverable in a survival ac-
tion are limited to only those losses sustained between the time of injury and 
the time of death). 
140. See Jones, 351 Md. at 129, 716 A.2d at 289 (reasoning that if loss of future earn-
ings were recoverable in a survival action, and were also recoverable in a 
wrongful death action, then a person may recover the same damages under 
two separate causes of action leading to a duplication of damages). 
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Maryland court, provide any rationale to support that such a policy 
was the intent of the Legislature. In the absence of such support, 
the plain and clear language of the statutes should not be 
ignored. 141 
Looking to the plain and clear language, the statute expressly 
provides that the estate may recover "funeral expenses . . . in addi~ 
tion to other damages recoverable in the action . . . ." 142 Thus it is 
clear that the Legislature intended for all damages to be recover~ 
able in a survival action commenced by the personal representative. 
From this reading, it follows that damages for future lost earnings 
were intended to be included in a survival action brought for per-
sonal injury.143 
The current interpretation given to the survival statute by the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland contradicts the plain and clear lan-
guage of the wrongful death and survival statutes, resulting in un~ 
just results. l44 The survival statute expressly grants personal repre-
sentatives the right to recover all damages "recoverable in the 
action."145 There are no words of limitation in the statute. l46 
Because the plain and clear language of both statutes allows for 
survival of all actions and recovery of all damages, a limitation on 
the damages recoverable is contrary to what the Legislature in-
tended. 147 Therefore, just as the Stewart court was incorrect fIfty~fIve 
years ago in creating this limitation, it is equally wrong for the Jones 
court to uphold it. 
141. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
142. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7401 (y) (Supp. 1999). 
143. See, e.g., Monias v. Endal, 330 Md. 274, 281, 623 A.2d 656, 659 (1993) (stating 
that loss of future earnings are recoverable in an action for personal injuries). 
See generaUy Burke v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 981, 998 (D. Md. 1985) (dis-
cussing the computation of lost earnings in a personal injury case); Anderson 
v. Litzenberg, 115 Md. App. 549, 572, 694 A.2d 150, 161 (1997) ("Essentially, 
an accident victim is entitled to be compensated to the extent his or her 
power to work ... has been reduced by the injury."). 
144. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (holding by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland that lost earnings are not recoverable in a survival action in Jones); 
Part II.B (discussing Maryland's survival statute) and Part I1I.B (discussing Ma-
ryland's wrongful death statute). 
145. MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7401(y) (Supp. 1999). 
146. See id. 
147. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6401 (1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & 
TRUSTS § 7401(y) (Supp. 1999); see also Purifoy v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & 
Trust Co., 273 Md. 58, 65-66, 327 A.2d 483, 487 (1974) (stating that legislative 
intent is ascertained by looking at the plain and clear language of the stat-
ute). 
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B. Legislative Intent 
"The cardinal rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain 
and carry out the legislative intent. "148 The primary source for de-
termining legislative intent is the statute's language. 149 Furthermore, 
where the language is clear and free from ambiguity, there is gener-
ally no need to look beyond the statute to determine the Legisla-
ture's intent. 150 
The language used in the personal representative statute is 
clear and unambiguous, 151 and should therefore be used to deter-
mine the Legislature's intent regarding any limitation on this stat-
ute. 152 The language of the statute provides that, with the exception 
of slander, "a cause of action at law ... survives the death of either 
party." 153 The Legislature clearly intended for all causes of action to 
survive. It logically follows that a personal injury action, brought to 
recover damages for future lost earnings, is included in the causes 
of action that survive. 
Although the first survival statute appeared in 1795, at the time 
of the wrongful death statute's adoption in 1852, the ability to com-
mence a survival action when death resulted from a tortious injury 
did not exist. By enacting the wrongful death statute, Maryland leg-
islators sought to afford designated persons relief for injuries they 
148. Purifoy, 273 Md. at 65, 327 A,2d at 487 (citing Scoville Serv., Inc. v. Comptrol-
ler, 269 Md. 390, 306 A,2d 534 (1973»; accord Board of Trustees v. Kielczewski, 
77 Md. App. 581, 587, 551 A.2d 485, 488 (1989) ("In determining that intent, 
the Court considers the language of an enactment in its natural and ordinary 
signification."). See generally State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421, 423-24, 348 A.2d 
275, 278, 280 (1975) (determining that the Legislature clearly intended the 
term "cause" in child abuse cases to include injuries resulting from cruel and 
inhumane treatment); Scoville Scm, 269 Md. at 393, 396, 306 A,2d at 537-38 
(holding that the Legislature did not intend for the common-place meaning 
of the word "admissions" to include parking fees). 
149. See, e.g., Kielczewski, 77 Md. App. at 587, 551 A,2d at 488. 
150. See id. at 587, 551 A,2d at 488 ("[I]f there is no ambiguity or obscurity in the 
language of the statute, there is usually no need to look elsewhere to ascer-
tain the intent of the General Assembly."). See generally Maryland Med. Serv., 
Inc. v. Carter, 238 Md. 466, 478, 209 A.2d 582, 588-89 (1965) (finding that a 
statute regarding reimbursement of subscribers for medical services was unam-
biguous on its face, there was no need to look elsewhere). 
151. See infra note 153; see also supra Part II.B. 
152. See Board of License Comm. v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 124, 729 A.2d 407, 411 
(1999) ("[W]hen 'there is a lack of relevant legislative history, we must rely 
substantially on the language of the statutes in the context of the goals and 
objectives they seek to achieve.'''). 
153. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 6401 (a) (1999). 
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suffered due to a tortfeasor's actions. Thirty-six years later, these leg-
islators again sought to expand the relief afforded to a tortfeasor's 
victims by deleting the restriction abating tort actions upon death. 154 
Since this expansion occurred after the enactment of the 
wrongful death statute, had the Legislature intended to eliminate 
the possibility of double recovery, they could have expressly distin-
guished the damages allowed under a survival action from those al-
lowed in a wrongful death action. 155 The fact that no limiting lan-
guage exists is significant, especially because the statutory language 
explaining non-economic damages in personal injury actions specifi-
cally references the wrongful death statute and expressly differenti-
ates wrongful death action damages. 156 
In addition to the legislative intent expressed in the plain and 
clear language of Maryland's survival statute, the only explicit limita-
tion provided is that actions for slander do not survive. 157 If the Leg-
islature intended to further restrict the actions that survive, to ex-
clude those for future lost earnings, it would have done this when 
the statute was adopted or last revised. 15s The Legislature has not 
154. See supra Part II.B.1; see also Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. l38, 151, 571 A.2d 1219, 
1225 (1990) (Eldridge, j., dissenting) (noting that "[b]y the late nineteenth 
century, the exclusion for tortious injuries had been eliminated, giving execu-
tors and administrators full power to commence suits for the recovery of dam-
ages for injuries suffered by the testator or intestate in his lifetime"). 
155. See supra Part II.B.1. 
156. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 11-108 (a) providing: 
[d. 
In this section ... (2) (i) "Noneconomic damages" means: 1. In an 
action for personal injury, pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical 
impairment, disfigurement, loss of consortium, or other nonpecu-
niary injury; and 2. In an action for wrongful death, mental anguish, 
emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companionship, com-
fort, protection, care, marital care, parental care, filial care, atten-
tion, advice, counsel, training, guidance, or education, or other 
noneconomic damages authorized under Title 3, Subtitle 9 of this ar-
ticle. (ii) "Noneconomic damages" does not include punitive dam-
ages. (3) "Primary claimant" means a claimant in an action for the 
death of person described under § 3-904(d) of this article. 
157. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 6401 (b) (1998). 
158. This is also a classic statutory construction argument known as expressio unius 
est exclusio alterious. See Long v. State, 343 Md. 662, 666 & n.l, 684 A.2d 445, 
447 & n.l (1996) ('''[T]he expression of one thing is the exclusion of an-
other.'''(quoting BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990»). By expressly 
listing slander as a cause of action not covered by the statute, many courts 
would conclude that the Maryland General Assembly intended the statute to 
include all other causes of action. See id.; see also BFP v. Resolution Trust 
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done SO.159 
As noted earlier, neither the survival statute nor the personal 
representative statute limit the types of damages recoverable in a 
personal injury action brought under the survival statute. 160 The 
Stewart court correcdy held that the estate may recover those dam-
ages that the decedent could have recovered, had the decedent sur-
vived. 161 This holding comports with the intent of the Legislature, 
given the clear and plain language of both statutes. 162 The Stewart 
court was not correct, however, in limiting those damages because 
the statute did not expressly provide for such a limitation. 163 The 
ability to create such a limitation rests solely with the Legislature 
and should be left alone by the courts. l64 It is incorrect for the 
court to do so to further a policy which prevents the overlap of 
damages, when such a policy is not the intent of the Legislature. 165 
The court of appeals has stated that "where the language of the 
Corp., 511 U.S. 531,537 (1994); United States v. Espinoza-Leon, 873 F.2d 743, 
746 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989). 
159. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 6401 (b) (1998), with MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 6-401(b) (Supp. 2000), wherein no changes have 
been made to the statute's language. 
160. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 
161. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 342-43, 65 A, 49, 
53 (1906) (noting that the damages recoverable under each statute are "en-
tirely different"). 
162. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUDo PROC. § 6401 (a) (Supp. 1998) (stating that a 
cause of action survives the death of either party whether real, personal, or 
mixed); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 7-401 (y) (Supp. 1999) (stating that a 
personal representative may commence a claim for personal injuries under 
the survival statute and may recover all damages recoverable in the action); 
see also discussion supra Part IV.A, 
163. See Employment Sec. Admin. v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 292 Md. 515, 526, 438 
A.2d 1356, 1363 (1982) (stating that "courts will not, under the guise of statu-
tory construction, supply omissions or remedy possible defects in a statute, or 
insert exceptions not made by the legislature"); Collier v. Connolly, 285 Md. 
123, 128, 400 A,2d 1107, 1109 (1979) (stating that it is not proper for the 
courts in construing statutes to supply omissions or remedy defects in statutes, 
or to insert provisions not made by the legislature). 
164. See Consolidated Eng'g Co. v. Cooper, 246 Md. 610, 615, 228 A,2d 823, 825 
(1967) (declaring that the courts may interpret and construe laws, but only 
the legislature has the power to amend them). 
165. See Purifoy V. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 273 Md. 58, 66, 327 A,2d 
483, 487 (1974) (stating that it is beyond the courts' liberty to disregard the 
natural import of the clear and unambiguous words of a statute with a view 
towards making the statute express an intention different from its plain mean-
ing). 
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statute is clear and explicit, . . . the court cannot disregard the 
mandate of the Legislature and insert an exception, where none 
has been made by the Legislature, for the sake of relieving against 
hardship or injustice."I66 
Furthermore, the losses sought under each statute are com-
pletely different. 167 Recovery of future lost earnings under the sur-
vival statute compensates the estate for a separate loss than for lost 
earnings under the wrongful death statute. 168 Therefore, it is not 
true, as the Jones court stated, that allowing such recovery would 
eliminate the line drawn by the Legislature under the wrongful 
death statute. 169 The line would still remain for limiting those who 
could recover damages under the wrongful death statute for the 
loss suffered due to the tort victim's death.I7O The Legislature never 
intended to limit the recovery of damages under the survival statute 
for the loss suffered by the tort victim, so limiting an estate from re-
covery would undermine the Legislature's intent. By limiting the 
survival statute, Maryland courts violated this doctrine of statutory 
construction. 
C. Other Jurisdictions Have Followed Similar Interpretations of the Sur-
vival Statutes 
The interpretation of the survival statute, as including damages 
for future lost earnings, has been adopted by courts in the District 
of Columbia171 and in the State of Washington. 172 Interpreting a sur-
vival statute 173 similar in language to Maryland's, District of Colum-
166. Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371, 375, 46 A.2d 619, 621 (1946) (noting that 
where there is ambiguity in the statute or the intention of the Legislature is 
doubtful, the court may look to the consequences but a judge does not have 
the power to mold the statute in accordance with his notions of justice). 
167. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 34344, 65 A. 49, 
54 (1906). 
168. See id. at 343, 65 A. at 53 (stating that recovery under the survival statute is 
limited to compensation for pain and suffering and loss of time and expenses 
whereas recovery under the wrongful death statute is measured by the value 
of life of the party entitled to damages). 
169. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 129,716 A.2d 285, 289 (1998) (stating that if 
loss of future earnings damages were permitted, the class of persons who may 
sue for post-death earnings would extend far beyond the relationships speci-
fied in the wrongful death statute). 
170. See MD. CODE ANN .. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904 (1998). 
171. See Runyon v. District of Columbia, 463 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
172. See Criscuola v. Andrews, 507 P.2d 149 (Wash. 1973). 
173. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-101 (Supp. 1999). The statute provides, "[o]n the 
death of a person in whose favor or against whom a right of action has ac-
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bia courts hold that the purpose of the survival statute is to place 
the decedent's estate in the same position it would have enjoyed 
had the decedent's life not been prematurely terminated. 174 The 
District of Columbia Circuit also holds that a proper recovery under 
the statute includes future lost earnings. 175 
In further support of including future lost earnings under the 
Maryland survival statute, the Supreme Court of Washington, inter-
preting a survival statute similar to Maryland's, held that allowing 
prospective earnings is consistent with the rule that "all" personal 
injury causes of action survive. 176 The court recognized that some ju-
risdictions have limited recovery in survival statutes to losses in-
curred before death, in an effort to avoid double recovery where an 
action for wrongful death is also brought. 177 The court found that, 
while limiting such damages is one way to provide for damages 
under the survival statute to prevent double recovery, it is "an inap-
propriate procedure."178 The court reasoned that limiting recovery 
in a survival action to the net accumulations of the deceased obvi-
ates the problem of double recovery where a wrongful death action 
is also brought. 179 
D. Unjust Results Exist Under Current Maryland Law 
When a tortfeasor is liable for causing injuries or losses to an-
other, the tortfeasor must be responsible for compensating the vic-
tim for such injuries or losses.18o Thus, if a tortfeasor causes another 
to lose all future earnings, that tortfeasor is liable for compensating 
crued for any cause prior to his death, the right of action, for all such cases, 
survives in favor of or against the legal representative of the deceased.» Id. 
174. See, e.g., Graves v. United States, 517 F. Supp. 95,99 (D.D.C. 1981) ("Recovery 
under the Survival Statute is comprised of that which the deceased would 
have been able to recover had he lived." (citing Semler v. Psychiatric lnst. of 
Washington, D.C., Inc., 575 F.2d 922, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1978»). 
175. See Runyon, 463 F.2d at 1321-22 ("Pursuant to the Survival Statute, we think it 
is proper for the estate of the deceased to recover an amount based on prob-
able net future earnings, discounted to present worth .... "). 
176. See Criscuola, 507 P.2d at 150-51 (holding that all personal injury causes of ac-
tion survive including damages for loss of prospective earnings). 
177. See id. at 150. 
178. [d. 
179. See id. 
180. See Krawill Mach. Corp. v. Rubert C. Herd & Co., 145 F. Supp. 554, 559 (D. 
Md. 1956) ("The general rule is that a person is liable for all pecuniary dam-
ages proximately caused by any negligence with which he is chargeable."). 
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that person for those future lost earnings. 181 Consequently, when a 
person dies due to another's negligence, it is only equitable that the 
estate be allowed to recover future lost earnings in a survival ac-
tion. 182 Allowing a tortfeasor to escape liability creates a windfall for 
the tortfeasor. 183 
The Jones court's holding was improper and evidenced the 
court's confusion regarding recovery under the wrongful death stat-
ute and the survival statute, despite ·the lengthy discussion of the is-
sue in Stewart. 184 The court mistakenly assumed that a remedy for 
the parents would somehow compensate for all of the damage from 
the victim's death, resulting in a windfall for the tortfeasor. 185 The 
court incorrectly equated the right to recover certain damages 
under the wrongful death statute as being sufficient compensation 
for the loss sustained by the estate under the survival statute. 186 The 
181. See id. 
182. See Karl L. Rubinstein, Personal Injuries and the Texas Survival Statute: The Case 
for Recavery of Damages for Decedent's Lost Future Earnings, 12 ST. MARy's LJ. 49, 
54 (1980) (stating that the estate suffers economic harm and financial loss 
due to loss of future earnings). Since the primary reason for recovering dam-
ages is to compensate for a loss caused by someone else, it is only fair that 
the estate be allowed to recover those losses it has suffered. See 8 M.L.E. Dam-
ages § 4 (1985). Maryland Law Encyclopedia states: 
The primary object of an award of damages in a civil action, and the 
theory upon which it is based, is just compensation or indemnity for 
the loss or injury sustained, so that the injured party may be made 
whole, and restored, as nearly as possible, to the position or condi-
tion he was in prior to the i~ury. 
Id. (citing Weishaar v. Canestrale, 241 Md. 676, 217 A.2d 525 (1966); Kahn v. 
Carl Schoen Silk Corp., 147 Md. 516, 128 A. 359 (1925); 25 CJ.S. Damages § 3 
(1966». 
183. See Rubinstein, supra note 182, at 67 ("Unless the estate is allowed to recover 
for the net lost future earnings that would have been contributed to it, then 
[the] law would be allowing only a 'fractional recovery.' A fractional recovery 
should be as abhorrent as a double recovery or triple recovery."); see also 
Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149, 159, 297 A.2d 721, 727 (1972) 
(" '[I]f a wrongdoer may be punished if his victim lives, then surely he should 
not escape the retribution if his wrongful act causes a death.''' (quoting 
Leahy v. Morgan, 275 F. Supp. 424, 425 (E.D. Iowa 1967»). 
184. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 339, 65 A. 49, 52 
(1906) (stating that the survival statute and wrongful death statute are two 
separate and distinct actions and allow for separate and distinct recoveries). 
185. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, l31, 716 A.2d 285,290 (1998). 
186. See Biro v. Schombert, 41 Md. App. 658, 666, 398 A.2d 519, 524 (1979) (infer-
ring that the fact that parents are not without a remedy means that they will 
be adequately compensated). 
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Stewart court made clear that actions created by the two statutes are 
distinct. 187 Recovery under one statute does not preclude recovery 
under the other. Therefore, not only is there a windfall to the 
wrongdoer, but there exists insufficient compensation to the dece-
dent's estate. 
Also, when a tortfeasor causes the death of another, and there-
fore causes a total loss of all future earnings, not only has the dece-
dent suffered a loss, but the estate of the decedent has also suffered 
a 10SS.188 If the victim lives, then that person will be able to recover 
future lost earnings in a personal injury action to the ultimate bene-
fit of the estate. 189 However, if the person dies before bringing that 
cause of action, then the estate will not be entitled to recover for 
that 10SS.19O The subsequent death of the individual should not be 
grounds for denying the estate recovery. 191 
Finally, the Stewart court concluded that the Legislature 
adopted the survival statute to provide recovery for losses not al-
lowed under the wrongful death statute. i92 Under the latter statute, 
the only losses recoverable for a wrongful or negligent death are 
those suffered by others as a result of the death. 193 These losses do 
not include future lost earnings sustained by the deceased. 194 How-
187. See Stewart, 104 Md. at 339, 65 A. at 52 ("The suits are by different persons, 
the damages go into different channels and are recovered upon different 
grounds, and the causes of action, though growing out of the same wrongful 
act or neglect, are entirely distinct."). 
188. See Rubinstein, supra note 182, at 54 (stating that future lost earnings are a 
loss to the estate causing economic harm and financial loss). 
189. See Monias v. Endal, 330 Md. 274, 280, 623 A.2d 656, 659 (1993). 
190. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 131,716 A.2d 285, 290 (1998). 
191. See Stewart, 104 Md. at 344, 65 A. at 54 ('" [I]f a person be wrongfully injured, 
the pain and suffering and expense to him in consequence thereof shall not 
be lost to his estate by the circumstance of his death from the injury before 
receiving satisfaction for his damages ... .'" (quoting Brown v. Chicago N.W. 
Ry. Co., 78 N.W. 771, 777 (Wis. 1899»); see also Rubinstein, supra note 182, at 
55. 
192. See Stewart, 104 Md. at 339, 65 A. at 52 (stating that it is presumed that the 
legislature intended, by the enactment of the survival statute, to give a remedy 
for injuries which the wrongful death statute did not provide). 
193. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904 (1998); ACandS, Inc. v. Asner, 
104 Md. App. 608, 645, 657 A.2d 379, 397 (1995) (noting that in a wrongful 
death action, damages are measured in terms of harm to others from the loss 
of the decedent); see also discussion supra Part lILA (discussing losses recover-
able under the wrongful death statute). 
194. See ACandS, 104 Md. App. at 643-45, 657 A.2d at 39&.97. Section 3-904 of the 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article does provide that future lost earnings 
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ever, the survival statute does provide recovery for these losses. 195 
Therefore, if the courts do not allow the estate to recover future 
lost earnings in a survival action, a loss would exist that is neither 
recoverable under the wrongful death statute nor the survival stat-
ute. It would be a grave disservice for Maryland courts to continue 
to allow such a loss to go unrecovered because" [t]he fundamental 
goal of tort recovery is compensation of the victim, i.e., to put the 
victim, insofar as money damages may do so, in the position he 
would have been absent the tort."196 
VII. PROBLEMS NOTED BY MARYLAND COURTS ARE NOT AN 
ISSUE WITH THIS SUGGESTED APPROACH 
The Jones decision appears well-supported and reasoned, given 
the decisions leading up to it. 197 Unfortunately, just as earlier Mary-
land courts had done, the Jones court adopted a judicially created 
doctrine contrary to legislative intent, confused and misapplied the 
related, but separate and distinct, wrongful death and survival stat-
utes, and adhered to judicial precedents resulting in inequitable 
and unjust consequences. In fact, the Jones court used a hypotheti-
cal similar to the one at the beginning of this Comment,198 yet did 
not recognize the inequitable and unjust results it demonstrated. l99 
Therefore, the justification for changing the law becomes even 
clearer after addressing the problems which surfaced as a result of 
the Jones decision. 
are included in the evaluation of damages. However, they are limited to the 
amount of loss of support that the claimant has suffered as a result of the 
person's death. See Metzger v. Steamship Kristen Torm, 245 F. Supp. 227, 234 (D. 
Md. 1965) (explaining that damages may be awarded under the wrongful 
death statute to a widow for both present and future pecuniary losses suffered 
by her as a result of the death of her husband). Therefore, the loss of sup-
port suffered by those other than the deceased is different and distinct from 
the loss of future earnings suffered by the deceased, and recovery for that loss 
does not equate with compensation for any loss suffered by the deceased. See 
Stewart, 104 Md. at 339, 65 A. at 52. 
195. See discussion supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. 
196. Tucker v. Calmar Steamship Corp., 356 F. Supp. 709, 711 (D. Md. 1973) (cit-
ing 25 C.J.S. Damages § 71, at 836 (1966); 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING 
JAMESJR., THE LAw OF TORTS § 25.1, at 1299 (1956». 
197. See discussion supra Part V. 
198. See supra Part I. 
199. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 131-32,716 A.2d 285, 290 (1998) (stating that 
if a person lives to the date of judgment in a personal i~ury action, the per-
son may recover future lost earnings; but if a person dies before judgment, 
there are no future lost earnings damages). 
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A. Double Recovery 
The court in Jones concluded that if losses for future earnings 
were recoverable in survival actions, double recovery would be possi-
ble.2°O The Stewart court first embraced the decision to limit dam-
ages recoverable in a survival action to those between the time of 
injury and the time of death to prevent duplicating damages.201 Un-
fortunately, the Stewart court misapplied the notion of double recov-
ery with regard to the survival and wrongful death actions, as did 
the court in Jones. 
In general, double recovery occurs when the plaintiff recovers 
twice for the same wrong or for the same element of damage.202 For 
example, in a personal injury action, if a plaintiff is awarded dam-
ages for both impairment of her ability to earn money and for im-
pairment of her physical ability to perform certain tasks, no double 
recovery would occur, as both essentially amount to "lost future 
earnings. "203 
However, recovery of future lost earnings in a survival action is 
different. Both the wrongful death beneficiaries and the decedent's 
estate are entitled to recover for that loss, because both have been 
deprived of the benefits of the decedent's future earnings.204 To al-
low the wrongful death beneficiaries to recover, but not the dece-
dent's estate, results in a windfall to the tortfeasor, while the estate 
receives only a fractional recovery.205 Therefore, the limitation 
placed on recovery of damages in a survival action has no effect on 
preventing double recovery; rather it causes the decedent's estate to 
recover only a fraction of its actual loss. A fractional recovery is just 
as intolerable as a double recovery, or worse, since the primary pur-
200. See id. at 125, 716 A.2d at 287 (stating that if loss of future earnings was recov-
erable, there would be a "high risk of duplicating the damages in a compan-
ion wrongful death case"). 
20l. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 344, 65 A. 49, 54 
(1906) (stating that in order to prevent defendants from being exposed to a 
danger of injustice, meaning double recovery, the damages under the survival 
statute must be limited to those sustained between time of injury and time of 
death). 
202. See Shapiro v. Chapman, 70 Md. App. 307, 315, 520 A.2d 1330, 1334 (1987) 
(stating that a plaintiff may not recover twice for the same tort). 
203. Rubinstein, supra note 182, at 66-67 (providing a similar example of a plaintiff 
unable to recover for the same tort). 
204. See id. at 67 (noting that while a defendant should not be required to pay mom 
than once for the same element of damage, a tortfeasor, nevertheless, should 
be required to pay once for each element of damage). 
205. See id. 
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pose of recovery of damages is to be compensated justly and fairly 
for the losses sustained as a result of another's acts.206 
Furthermore, the limitation applied by the court in Stewart is 
unsound given the court's own conclusion that both the wrongful 
death statute and the survival statute create two distinct causes of 
action that provide for two separate recoveries.207 By their very na-
ture, damages recovered under one would not overlap with dam-
ages recovered under the other.208 
By holding that damages for future lost earnings are not recov-
erable in a survival action, Maryland courts have not followed the 
letter of the personal representative statute.209 That statute expressly 
grants personal representatives the right to recover all damages "re-
coverable in the action; "210 there is no limitation in the statute. 
The Jones court specifically misapplied Maryland's survivor stat-
ute,211 limiting the type of damages recoverable, by precluding a 
personal representative's recovery of future lost earnings.212 The 
court's rationale for limiting survival action damages to only those 
incurred between the time of injury and death was that if an award 
of damages were extended beyond death, the type of damages 
awarded would overlap with those damages recoverable under the 
wrongful death statute.213 
The court of appeals contended that the estate's attempt to re-
cover future lost earnings suffered by the deceased was actually the 
206. See Tucker v. Calmar Steamship Corp., 356 F. Supp 709, 711 (D. Md. 1973) 
(noting that the fundamental goal of tort recovery is compensation of the vic-
tim); 25 CJ.S. Damages § 3, at 626 (1966) (stating that the primary object of 
civil damages awards is just compensation). 
207. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 339, 65 A. 49, 52 
(1906). 
208. See id. at 342-44, 65 A. at 53-54 (clarifying that the two actions accomplish dif-
ferent results and are for the benefit of wholly different persons, thereby the 
satisfaction of one can in no way affect the other); see also discussion supra 
Part VI.C. 
209. See MD. CODE ANN .. EST. & TRUSTS § 7401(y) (Supp. 1999). 
210. [d. 
211. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 6401 (1998). 
212. See Jones v. Flood, 351 Md. 120, 131-32,716 A.2d 285,290 (1998) (refusing to 
expand the damages recoverable in a survival action beyond death). 
213. See id. at 125, 716 A.2d at 287 (stating that the court declines to include post-
death lost earnings in a survival action because the change would involve a 
high risk of duplication of the damages in a companion wrongful death ac-
tion); Stewart, 104 Md. at 344, 65 A. at 54 (stating that the defendant will not 
be exposed to any injustice, meaning double recovery, because the recovery is 
limited to the loss actually sustained by the deceased prior to death). 
130 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 29 
estate's attempt to recover damages only intended for designated 
beneficiaries.214 The court made it clear that the legislature created 
a class of individuals who were permitted to recover a decedent's fu-
ture lost earnings under the wrongful death statute, and an attempt 
to recover those future lost earnings in a survival action under-
mined that limitation.215 Here, the court misapplied and confused 
the two statutes. 
Because a wrongful death action and a survival action are sepa-
rate and distinct causes of action,216 it follows that no where does re-
covery under one overlap with recovery under the other.217 Put an-
other way, an attempt to recover certain damages under the survival 
statute is separate and distinct from an attempt to recover certain 
damages under the wrongful death statute.218 Therefore, the court 
incorrectly stated that the estate's attempt to recover future lost 
earnings in a survival action is actually an attempt to recover dam-
ages only permitted under the wrongful death statute.219 
The rationale for allowing recovery of future lost wages and 
further dispelling the fear of double recovery is found in Monias v. 
Endal,220 a case decided by the Maryland Court of Appeals in 1993. 
In Monias, the court decided whether an award for future lost earn-
ings due to premature death was recoverable. 221 The court distin-
guished a "personal injury" action from a wrongful death action.222 
That distinction is critical because, in contrast to a wrongful death 
214. See Jones, 351 Md. at 128-29, 716 A.2d at 289 (stating that because the legisla-
ture has limited who may and may not recover post-death earnings by way of 
the wrongful death statute, a survival action for loss of future earnings is an 
"end-run around" that limitation in an effort to collect post-death earnings). 
215. See id. (stating that the Jones's action is an attempt to undermine the legisla-
tively imposed limitation). 
216. See supra Part IV. 
217. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 34344, 65 A. 49, 
54 (1906) (stating that since a wrongful death action and survival action are 
separate and distinct causes of action which allow for the recovery of damages 
for two separate and different types of losses that are sustained by two sepa-
rate and distinct classes of persons, then recovery under one can in no way af-
fect the other). 
218. See id. (stating that "neither of those actions is the alternative of, or substitute 
for, the other"). 
219. See id. at 344, 65 A. at 54 (stating that the estate will not lose any recovery on 
a survival action if the estate subsequently pursues a wrongful death action). 
220. 330 Md. 274, 623 A.2d 656 (1993). 
221. See id. at 279, 623 A.2d at 658. 
222. See id. 
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action, among the possible types of survival actions is a personal in-
jury action initiated or continued by the estate administrator. 
In Monias, the personal injury action was initiated while the 
tort victim was alive.223 The court recognized the potential for 
double recovery if the victim's husband was awarded damages for 
"loss of support" in a wrongful death action.224 Rather than shy 
away from providing a just recovery for this victim, the court merely 
espoused that the "plaintiff's recovery in this action will obviously 
preclude a subsequent claim for loss of support in a wrongful death 
action for at least the same years included in the lost earnings 
award. "225 The court of appeals felt no need to establish a rigid 
formula to ensure that double recovery did not occur. 
In addition, the court considered whether the plaintiff could 
recover "loss of income" for the "lost years," i.e., the years between 
the plaintiff's premature death and the normal expected retirement 
age.226 Despite an earlier ruling that a plaintiff was not generally en-
titled to "lost years" recovery, the court determined the proper 
measure of damages to be the "loss of earnings based on the plain-
tiff's life expectancy had the tortious conduct not occurred, rather 
than loss of earnings based on the plaintiff's post-tort shortened life 
expectancy. "227 The court further reasoned that it could not "permit 
the tortfeasor to reduce liability ... by reducing the victim's life 
expectancy. "228 
In sum, a double recovery exists when a defendant pays twice 
for the same loss. The survival statute and the wrongful death statute 
provide for recovery of two different 10sses.229 Therefore, allowing 
wrongful death beneficiaries to recover the loss of the decedent's 
future earnings, and allowing the decedent's estate to recover the 
loss of the decedent's future lost earnings, will not lead to a double 
recovery.230 
223. See id. at 276, 623 A.2d at 657. 
224. See id. at 279-80, 623 A.2d at 658. 
225. [d. 
226. See id. at 28(}'81, 623 A.2d at 659. 
227. [d. at 281, 623 A.2d at 659 (noting that in the previous holding, the specific 
issue of "lost earnings" was not before the court). 
228. [d. at 282, 623 A.2d at 660. 
229. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 343, 65 A. 49, 53 
(1906). 
230. See Rubinstein, supra note 182, at 67-68. 
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B. Courts Accept and Encourage Deviation From Well-Established Law If 
Adherence Is Unsound or No Longer Suitable 
The principle of stare decisis is a policy whereby courts adhere 
to precedent rather than departing from settled points of law.23i 
This principle affords certainty and stability in the law.232 However, 
where the rule has become unsound and no longer suitable, the 
court may, and should, ignore the doctrine and depart from settled 
law. 233 
Currently, future lost earnings are not recoverable in a survival 
action. 234 However, because further adherence to this law leads to 
fractional recovery for the decedent's estate and allows the 
tortfeasor a windfall, a change in the law is necessary, despite the 
importance of stare decisis.235 
Maryland courts have used varying rationales for changing com-
mon-law principles. For instance, Maryland courts have relied upon 
legislative public policy pronouncements in statutes to uphold deci-
231. See 7 M.L.E. Courts § 52 (1985); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990). 
The doctrine of stare decisis reflects a "policy which entails the reaffirmation 
of a decisional doctrine of an appellate court, even though if considered for 
the first time, the Court [sic] might reach a different conclusion." See Harri-
son v. Montgomery Co. Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 442, 458, 456 A.2d 894, 902 
(1983). 
232. See Post v. Bregman, 112 Md. App. 738, 761, 686 A.2d 665, 676 (1996) (stating 
that the doctrine of stare decisis allows society to take comfort in knowing 
what the law is, and what it will be in the future); Harrison, 295 Md. at 458-59, 
456 A.2d at 902 (stating that stare decisis exists for certainty and stability); 
Deems v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 247 Md. 95, 102, 231 A.2d 514, 518 (1966) 
(stating that, for certainty and stability, the doctrine of stare decisis is in-
voked, usually leaving changes to the Legislature). 
233. See Post, 112 Md. App. at 761, 686 A.2d at 675 (stating that stare decisis directs 
courts to avoid disturbing precedent unless the rule of law has become un-
sound and no longer suitable); Harrison, 295 Md. at 459,456 A.2d at 903 (stat-
ing that stare decisis does not prevent the court from changing a common-law 
rule where in light of changed circumstances or knowledge, the rule has be-
come unsound or no longer suitable); Pride Mark Realty v. Mullins, 30 Md. 
App. 497, 506, 352 A.2d 866, 871 (1976) (stating that the doctrine of stare de-
cisis is not to be followed if the court is shown that the rule has become un-
sound in the circumstances of modern life); see also White v. King, 244 Md. 
·348, 355, 223 A.2d 763, 767 (1965) (stating that in determining whether a law 
should be changed, the courts should consider the law's application on a 
case-by-case basis, look at whether different factual situations present new dif-
ficulties to be resolved, and whether there exist new factors to be weighed). 
234. See Jones, 351 Md. at 131, 716 A.2d at 290. 
235. See supra notes 183, 231-34 and accompanying text. 
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sions modifying the common law.236 At other times, the courts have 
looked solely to the persuasive authority of secondary sources and 
other jurisdictions to alter previously held common-law principles. 237 
At times, judges refuse to change a common-law principle 
under stare decisis or because they recognize that it is the legisla-
ture's role to declare public policy, and that decisions to alter such 
legal principles should be left to the Maryland General Assembly.238 
Maryland courts rely on the presumption that legislators are aware 
of judicial statutory interpretations, and thereby acquiesce when 
they do not overturn such judicial interpretations.239 This presump-
tion is strengthened when a statute is re-enacted, following judicial 
interpretation, without substantive change.240 At times, the Maryland 
courts have assumed, and not merely presumed, that General Assem-
bly inaction indicates an intent to maintain the status quo, because 
the legislators were "certainly aware" of the judicial arguments ad-
vanced for changing the common law, but chose not to act despite 
"repeated reminders of [their] role in the matter."241 
This presumption is not a universal view, and even the United 
States Supreme Court has cautioned against reading too much into 
legislative inaction, especially when legislators do not provide an ex-
236. See McGarvey v. McGarvey, 286 Md. 19, 27-28, 405 A.2d 250, 254-55 (1979) (re-
lying upon the statutory acceptance that a prior criminal conviction does not 
necessarily equate to lack of witness veracity to remove the common-law bar 
for persons with a prior criminal conviction from performing a will attesta-
tion) . 
237. See Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 564, 380 A.2d 611, 613 (1977) (upholding the 
decision, based on the lower court's rationale, to allow a tort action solely for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress). The court of special appeals 
based its conclusion upon the policy reasons in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, and the court of appeals dually noted that this change would be consis-
tent with 37 other jurisdictions. See id. at 564, 380 A.2d at 613. 
238. See Harrison, 295 Md. at 460, 456 A.2d at 903 (listing various cases supporting 
this proposition and the particular common-law rule left unchanged). 
239. See Sandford v. Maryland Police Training and Correctional Comm'n, 346 Md. 
374, 383, 697 A.2d 424, 428 (quoting "had the legislature intended to include 
... [it] within the terms of the statute, it would have done so, and since it 
did not, the implication is that ... [it was] purposefully excluded" (citations 
omitted». 
240. See Workers' Compensation Comm. v. Driver, 336 Md. 105, 121, 647 A.2d 96, 
104 (1994). 
241. Austin v. City of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 55-56, 405 A.2d 255, 257 (1979) (sup-
porting this assertion of the legislators' awareness by noting numerous cases 
abrogating the common-law sovereign immunity doctrine). 
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planation for this inaction.242 The Supreme Court reasoned that 
lack of repudiation by Congress of the Court's decision did not 
"serve as an implied instruction by Congress to us not to recon-
sider, in the light of new experience, whether those decisions" re-
main sound. 243 
The court in Jones rejected the plaintiff's attempt to change the 
law in Maryland so that future lost earnings would be recoverable, 
because the change would "effect a substantial upheaval in well-
established Maryland law, contrary to the stare decisis princi-
ple . . . . "244 Although such change would cause a substantial devia-
tion from well-established law, it is nonetheless necessary and com-
pelling in light of the inequitable and unjust results that adherence 
to the law continues to create. 
Certainly, if stare decisis was a simple concept to apply, the 
conclusion would suggest placing pressure on the legislators to pro-
vide statutory relief that values the victim's interest over the 
tortfeasor's. But stare decisis is not a simple, "one-size fits all" 
doctrine.245 
242. See Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-20 (1940) (categorizing this as a 
"venture into speculative unrealities"). 
243. [d. at 119 (stating that "[i]t would require very persuasive circumstances envel-
oping Congressional silence to debar this Court from re-examining its own 
doctrines"). 
244. See Jones, 351 Md. at 125,716 A.2d at 287. 
245. See, e.g, Howard v. Bishop Byrne Council Home, Inc., 249 Md. 233, 238 A.2d 
863 (1968) (refusing to abrogate the common-law charitable immunity rule 
noting that the 1947 General Assembly refused to adopt House Bill 99, 
preventing a charitable institution from using the immunity defense, and not-
ing that, where "present statutes are tangible evidence" that after careful in-
vestigation the legislature "arrived at a solution [they] deemed satisfactory," 
the court is not at liberty to change this public policy pronouncement); Joyce 
v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951) (emphasizing the General Assem-
bly's resistance to change the contributory negligence doctrine by rejecting 21 
legislative bills over the course of 17 years as indicating a clearly announced 
public policy decision). But see Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 273-74, 462 
A.2d 506, 521-22 (1983) (where the court of appeals willingly accepted the 
challenge to look to changed circumstances and decided that the common 
law was unsound in light of modem life); Harrison, 295 Md. at 461 n.12, 456 
A.2d at 904 n.12 (listing cases where the common law was changed or supple-
mented despite legislative inaction); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 
Md. 31, 45, 432 A.2d 464, 472 (1981) (determining that they were not re-
stricted to find public policy pronouncements in "legislative enactments, prior 
judicial decisions or administrative regulations," the Adler court did recom-
mend caution when adopting previously "undeclared public policy"); Lewis v. 
State, 285 Md. 705, 709, 404 A.2d 1073, 1075 (1975) (finding no reason to be 
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Refuting the stare decisis argument becomes easier when the 
trend among other jurisdictions is to abrogate the common law.246 
In Luslly v. LUSlly,247 the court held the common-law spousal immu-
nity doctrine inapplicable to an intentional tort case because many 
jurisdictions had abrogated the doctrine, since the issue was first de-
cided in that state ten years earlier.248 Notably, the court, relying on 
trends among other jurisdictions, specifically addressed the public 
policy concerns against reducing tortfeasor liability. 
This result is consistent with the general principle that if tor-
tious injury exists, there should be recovery, and only strong public 
policy arguments should justify judicially created immunity for 
tortfeasors, and a bar to recovery for injured victims.249 
When dealing with a judicially created legal principle, where 
public policy srongly demands a change to avoid an illogical result, 
legislative inaction cannot be allowed to immobilize the judicial sys-
tem. To accomplish the task before them, judges should analyze 
"the public policy concerns raised by the parties and by the other 
courts which have grappled with th[e] issue."25o 
The distinguishing feature in this instance is that the wrongful 
death and survival statutes at issue were enacted many years ago 
and have continued without substantive changes for over a century. 
These are not statutes under constant review; legislation attempting 
to alter their provisions is not frequently introduced. Courts con-
tinue to deny lost wages in a survival action by hiding behind the 
stare decisis "legislative inaction" cloak, repeatedly relying upon 
dicta made by a court at the turn of the twentieth century.251 Princi-
bound by stare decisis when the changed conditions and illogical result of the 
common-law principle mandated such action, and noting that Maryland was 
the only jurisdiction holding onto the common-law procedural rule under the 
accessoryship doctrine, precluding accessory adjudication before sentencing a 
principal) . 
246. See Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334,34647, 390 A.2d 77, 82-83 (1978). Due to the 
division among judicial decisions, the Lusby court also relied upon the "nearly 
unanimous" opinions of professional commentators criticizing the spousal im-
munity doctrine. Id. at 350, 390 A.2d at 84. 
247. 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978). 
248. See id. 
249. See id. at 347, 390 A.2d at 83 (quoting Lewis v. Lewis, 351 N.E.2d 526, 532 
(Mass. 1976». 
250. Gaver v. Harrant, 316 Md. 17, 30, 557 A.2d 210, 217 (1989) (continuing to de-
velop the judiciary's role of discerning social policy). 
251. See State v. Wilson, 106 Md. App. 24, 39, 664 A.2d 1, 8 (1995) (suggesting that 
dicta "should be given the weight [such words] would be given if the judge 
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pIes of public policy should guide the courts, rather than placing 
continued emphasis upon the doctrine of stare decisis, a principle 
which, in this instance, ignores the changed circumstances of mod-
ern life. 
C. The Court of Appeals Previously Adopted Similar Reasoning 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe 
CO.,252 determined that punitive damages are recoverable by a per-
sonal representative in a survival action, utilizing the same reason-
ing proposed here.253 Smith involved a personal injury action 
brought by the personal representative of the deceased's estate 
under the survival statute.254 The personal representative, the parent 
of a minor child killed in an automobile accident, brought suit 
against a corporate defendant and its employee.255 The suit was 
based on the negligent entrustment of the employee with a com-
pany truck, and the personal representative sought damages from 
the company through respondeat superior. 256 The personal repre-
sentative also sought the recovery of punitive damages.257 
The court observed that neither the survival statute, nor the 
personal representative statute, mentioned the type of damages re-
coverable by the personal representative in a survival action for per-
sonal injuries.258 However, the court applied the legal principles set 
had said them in a law review article or in a newspaper colum or in a talk to 
the Kiwanis Club"). In Wilson the court stated, "stare decisis is ill-served if 
readers hang slavishly on every casual or hurried word as if it had bubbled 
from the earth at Delphi. Obiter dicta, if noticed at all, should be taken with 
a large grain of salt." Id. 
252. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972). 
253. See id. at 160, 297 A.2d at 727 ("[W]e hold that a personal representative may 
recover exemplary damages in those cases where they might have been 
awarded to the decedent, whose estate he administers, had the former 
survived. ") . 
254. See id. at 152-53, 297 A.2d at 724. 
255. See id. at 152-53, 297 A.2d at 723-24. 
256. See id. See generally BlACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "re-
spondeat superior" as the common-law doctrine "holding an employer or 
principal liable for the employee'S or agent's wrongful acts committed within 
the scope of the employment or agency"). 
257. See Smith, 267 Md. at 152-53, 297 A.2d at 723-24. The court allowed the plain-
tiffs claim for punitive damages for negligently entrusting the employee, an 
18 year old, with a truck that was in a well-documented state of disrepair. See 
id. at 168, 297 A.2d at 732-33. 
258. See id. at 158, 297 A.2d at 727. 
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forth by the court earlier in Stewart,259 holding that, because puni-
tive damages were recoverable by a tort victim in a personal injury 
action if the victim survived and brought the action herself, then 
punitive damages were likewise recoverable by a personal represen-
tative bringing a personal injury action under the survival statute.260 
This is precisely the same legal analysis advocated with future lost 
earnings.261 Because damages for future lost earnings are recover-
able by a tort victim in the victim's own personal injury action, then 
these damages should similarly be recoverable by the victim's estate 
in a personal injury action brought under the survival statute.262 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Maryland courts created an injustice in the area of damages 
with the decisions of Stewart and Jones.263 The court refused to ex-
tend the recovery of future lost earnings to a decedent's estate 
under a survival statute.264 The current law allows a tortfeasor who 
fatally injures someone to reap a windfall that would otherwise not 
occur had the victim been injured and survived.265 
In view of the clear and unambiguous language of the survival 
and personal representative statutes266 and of the unjust and inequi-
table results that are possible under the current state of Maryland 
law,267 future lost earnings should be recoverable by the personal 
representative in a personal injury action under the survival stat-
ute.268 The clear language of the statutes does not limit the types of 
actions that survive, nor limits the types of damages recoverable in a 
survival action, and it is improper for Maryland courts to continue 
to create a limitation contrary to the clear statutory language.269 In 
addition, death results in the total diminishment of earnings. There 
is no logical reason to allow recovery for funeral expenses, yet not 
259. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
260. See Smith, 267 Md. at 160, 297 A.2d at 727. 
261. See supra Part V. 
262. See Stewart v. United Elec. Light & Power Co., 104 Md. 332, 34243, 65 A. 49, 
53 (1906) (holding that damages recoverable under a survival statute are 
those which the deceased might have recovered had he lived and brought the 
action himself). 
263. See supra Part V. 
264. See supra Part V.B. 
265. See supra Part V.B. 
266. See supra Part lV.A-B. 
267. See supra Part lV.D. 
268. See supra Part lV.B. 
269. See supra Part VI. 
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allow for recovery of future lost earnings-both are losses to the 
estate.270 
Simple syllogistic reasoning leads to the conclusion that future 
lost earnings damages should be recoverable in a survival action. 
The Maryland General Assembly decided that actions should survive 
a person's death and granted the decedent's personal representa-
tives the right to commence an action to recover those damages 
which could have been recovered had the deceased survived.271 For 
example, in an action for personal injury, if the deceased survived, 
the deceased would have been able to recover damages for future 
lost earnings.272 Therefore, it follows that the personal representa-
tive should be permitted to recover those future lost earnings in the 
survival action. 
If one were to analyse the statute today, without the judicial 
gloss, there would be only one interpretation. The conclusion that 
"lost earnings" are available in a survival action is evident, looking 
at the express language of section 6401, allowing survival of a per-
sonal injury cause of action; section 7-401 (y), granting the estate ad-
ministrator the power to commence a personal injury action on be-
half of the decedent; and section 11-109, providing not only for lost 
wages in a personal injury award, but also for payment to the dece-
dent's estate in the event of death. Giving an executor the power to 
commence a "personal injury" action and providing the victim's es-
tate with a mechanism to recover unpaid damages, necessitates all 
remedies to be included in a survival action that would be available 
to a living victim, including future lost earnings. 
Eric W. Gunderson 
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